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Abstract
Competition and cooperation represent two foundational elements within the strategic
management research domain. While substantial research examining competition or cooperation
exists, research assessing these two paradoxical actions simultaneously has been limited. This
study leverages the attention based view of the firm and insights from literature examining
organizational ambidexterity to further understand if, and how, these two seemingly
contradictory actions are managed and leveraged by firms. First, this research identifies and
assesses the extent to which attention within the firm shapes competitive and cooperative action.
Further, this research conceptually defines and empirically tests curvilinear relationships
between competitive and cooperative action and subsequent firm performance. Finally, this
study predicts and tests the performance implications associated with balancing competitive and
cooperative actions.
The findings suggest that attention to cooperation is associated with subsequent
cooperative action, and that the curvilinear relationship between cooperative action and firm
performance is moderated by cooperative action diversity such that high levels of action
diversity lead to poorer performance. In the context of competitive actions, the results are found
to be nonsignficant, but present valuable opportunities for future research.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, strategic management has developed into a respected domain
of academic inquiry within the social sciences. At the core of strategic management is the means
through which firms leverage resources to develop competitive advantages and enhance firm
performance (Nag, Hambrick, & Chen, 2007). Indeed, in a recent analysis of how the term
strategy has been defined since the field’s inception, the general concept of strategy has been
characterized as “the dynamics of the firm’s relation with its environment for which the
necessary actions are taken to achieve its goals and/or increase performance by means of the
rational use of resources” (Ronda‐Pupo & Guerras‐Martin, 2012). While strategic management
includes several independent substreams such as competitive dynamics (Chen & Miller, 2012),
interorganizational relationships (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011), the importance of internal
resources (Barney, 1991), and the nature of the external environment (Porter, 1991), the core
tenets of strategic management research focus on (1) a firm, (2) its actions, (3) application of
resources, and (4) the presence of, and interaction with, an external environment (Nag et al.,
2007). Each of these four elements is present in a firm’s competitive and cooperative decisions.
Considering the above definition of strategy, one of the core actions firms engage in
regularly is competition. Competitive actions are indicative of how a firm attempts to gain a
competitive advantage relative to peers, how a firm seeks out and implements strategies, and
how a firm leverages internal resources most effectively in the broader external environment
(Ketchen, Snow, & Hoover, 2004). Competition research within the domain of strategic
management represents the integration of the firm’s internal resources, the actions the firm takes
to capitalize on these resources, and the environments in which these behaviors are enacted
(Ferrier, 2001; Ndofor, Sirmon, & He, 2011; Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990). Due to the clear
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parallel between the definition of strategy and the nature of competition, research on competition
continues to remain a core stream of research within the domain of strategic management.
On the other hand, cooperation also represents a domain of research within strategic
management that has flourished due to clear parallels with the core elements of strategy.
Interorganizational relationships at multiple levels have attracted scholarly attention and
provided the academic community with rich insights into the motivation and outcomes
associated with engaging in cooperative actions (Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007; Ring & Van de
Ven, 1994). Topics such as how firms select partner firms, how firms manage the dynamics
associated with relationships, and how firms manage an alliance portfolio are all representative
of how and why firms engage in cooperation (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Jiang, Tao, & Santoro, 2010;
Parkhe, 1993). As firms engage in interorganizational relationships, they are directly engaging
the external environment and seeking out ways to acquire and leverage resources (Parmigiani &
Rivera-Santos, 2011). Considering the extant research conducted on cooperative behaviors of
firms, it is clear that cooperation research represents an integral element of strategic
management.
While competitive and cooperative behaviors are both core issues within the strategic
management research domain, little research has been conducted that integrates both types of
behaviors of the firm (Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 1997). Considering all firms engage in some type
of competitive activity and most firms engage in cooperative relationships, it is clear that the
majority of organizations engage in both competitive and cooperative behaviors, rather than one
or the other (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Also, research integrating competition and cooperation
remains relatively inconclusive as to the nature of the relationship between a firm’s competitive
and cooperative behaviors (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014). While scholars suggest the two are
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related and possibly interdependent, empirical work examining the extent to which these two
types of actions are related has been limited (Chen, 2008). In order to further develop strategic
management research in the domains of competition and cooperation, it is imperative that
research integrate both types of actions of the firm to understand (1) if the two are related, (2)
how the two are related, and (3) how the relationship between the two influences a firm’s
performance. This study surveys existing literature on both competition and cooperation, as well
as both attention-based view and ambidexterity literature to further understand how
organizations enact and manage competitive and cooperative actions simultaneously.
Competition and Cooperation
Independently, research on competition and cooperation has provided valuable
contributions to the literature. Competition research, for example, has extended the management
literature by studying how competition impacts interactions with other firms and how firm
behaviors relate to the firm’s competitive positioning relative to peers (Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm,
1999; Upson, Ketchen, Connelly, & Ranft, 2012). Within the broad domain of competition,
competitive dynamics researchers have integrated the interactive nature of competition among
firms and how actions and reactions influence the competitive environment of the firm (Rindova,
Ferrier, & Wiltbank, 2010). While this external approach to understanding competition provides
useful insights as to the nature of realized competition, it does not necessarily identify and
address how internal factors such as attention and limitations associated with attention influence
the decision and ability to engage in competitive activity. Research within the competition
domain have proposed stronger links between micro and macro organizational factors that could
provide both fields with rich insights (Chen & Miller, 2012). Within the competitive research
domain, research that simultaneously integrates and examines external contingencies with
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internal characteristics could offer a strong contribution and extension of the competition
literature.
While competition research has been an integral part of strategic management research,
researchers focused on cooperation have also made valuable contributions to the literature.
Building off of the proverb that ‘no man is an island,’ cooperation research suggests that no
organization truly exists completely independent of its relationships with others (Parmigiani &
Rivera-Santos, 2011). Cooperation research has flourished in terms of identifying the motivation
for interorganizational relationships, digging deeper into how firms manage cooperation within a
dyad, and also identified how a firm develops a network of cooperative engagements (Hillman,
Withers, & Collins, 2009; Provan et al., 2007). Traditionally, research has provided valuable
insights into joint ventures and alliances among industry peers as a means for assessing a firm’s
cooperative behaviors (Ahuja, Lampert, & Tandon, 2008; Brouthers & Hennart, 2007); however,
firms also engage upstream and downstream partners for cooperative relationships (Mayer &
Teece, 2008). Also, while the dynamics associated with dyadic cooperative engagements has
proven to be a strong area of focus for cooperation research, little research has identified and
assessed how firms manage cooperative engagements holistically from a portfolio perspective
that integrates and assesses a firm’s entire set of cooperative behaviors simultaneously
(Wassmer, 2010). While much research has been done on interorganizational relationships,
ample opportunities exist in areas such as non-industry relationships and also focusing attention
on a firm’s cooperative portfolio in its entirety rather than at the dyad level.
While both competition and cooperation research streams have developed and flourished
independently, the cross-fertilization between these two domains has been limited (Chen, 2008).
Research has examined the extent to which network positioning influences competitive
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behaviors, and how competition influences cooperation among firms (Gimeno, 2004; Gnyawali
& Madhavan, 2001); however, little research has examined the extent to which firms manage and
balance these two types of behaviors within the firm. While both competition and cooperation
have been studied extensively by strategic management scholars, integration of these two
domains of inquiry will provide strong contributions to both independent streams of research and
strategic management research at large. One of the purposes of this study is to identify and
assess the nature of the relationship between competition and cooperation by applying and
leveraging theoretical insights from the attention-based view of the firm and the ambidexterity
literature. By coupling the insights from the attention-based view with the logic presented in the
existing ambidexterity literature (March, 1991; Ocasio, 1997), the following section elaborates
on how these theoretical foundations provide an appropriate lens through which to view the
competition and cooperation paradox.
Theoretical Background
Integrating competition and cooperation into a research model necessitates the
application of theories that can shed light on how two seemingly contradictory actions can be
related and how these actions are managed by the firm. Competition and cooperation are
manifested in the actions of the firm, and these actions are indicative of where a firm directs its
attention (Cyert & March, 1963). As such, the attention based view (ABV) of the firm can be
leveraged as a means for understanding how a firm’s actions are a result of where the firm
directs its organizational attention and focuses its finite cognitive resources (Ocasio, 1997).
Firms develop strategies, apply resources, and enact behaviors based on the extent to which they
structure and focus their organizational attention as a means for improving performance
(Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). Where a firm focuses attention will likely be manifested in firm
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actions, and these actions, in turn, are likely to be related to the firm’s performance. As such, I
present a research model that assesses where firms focus attention, the firms subsequent actions,
and the performance associated with these previous actions. While the attention based view of
the firm suggests that an organization’s attention is likely to predict its actions (Ocasio, 2011),
little research has explicitly focused on attention at the firm level.
A second literature that can provide insights into the nature of the relationship between
competition and cooperation can be found in the research on ambidexterity. Ambidexterity
research suggests that firms engage in exploratory and exploitative behaviors and must manage
these behaviors in a way that maximizes the firm’s performance (March, 1991). Exploratory
behaviors are represented by behaviors focused on developing new products and pioneering new
technologies, whereas exploitative behaviors are represented by how a firm hopes to capitalize
on its existing technologies or leveraging current resources to improve performance (He &
Wong, 2004). The exploration versus exploitation paradox shares many parallels with the
discussion about how competition and cooperation may be related, namely the extent to which
these behaviors are directly or interactively related (Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006). The core
elements of ambidexterity that are critical to understanding the current research model are (1) the
paradoxical nature of competition and cooperation and (2) the concept of balance of these
seemingly opposing actions. By leveraging insights from the ambidexterity literature, this study
takes a critical first step to clarify some of the questions regarding if and how competition and
cooperation are related and may need to co-exist.
Research Model
The purpose of this study is to address two gaps in the competition and cooperation
research streams—namely the lack of integration across these two streams of research and the
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integration of micro and macro factors of the firm simultaneously. This study also seeks to
extend the theoretical application of both the attention-based view of the firm and ambidexterity
literature to further understand the nature of the relationship between competition and
cooperation. The present study makes one of the first applications of attention-based view of the
firm to the organizational level, and also extends the ambidexterity logic to a new context by
assessing how the predictions from ambidexterity relate to how a firm balances competition and
cooperation and how this balance influences the firm’s performance. Finally, the nature and
diversity of competitive and cooperative actions are identified as important moderators of how
competition, cooperation, and the balance of these two influence a firm’s performance. Each of
these issues is discussed below.
The attention-based view of the firm suggests that where a firm focuses its organizational
attention is also where actions will be enacted (Ocasio, 1997). As such, the front end of the
model displayed in Figure 1 proposes that where a firm directs its attention is positively related
to the actions that are indicative of this type of attention. For example, if a firm is investing
heavily in product innovation and R&D, it is likely that the firm will engage in competitive
actions that are related to this attention to product development. These include actions initiated
by a focal firm, as well as reactive competitive actions that are responses to the behaviors of
other competitors (Ferrier, 2001). On the flip side, it can also be expected that a firm that invests
attention in joint research collaborations (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), the firm will engage in
higher levels of cooperation in these domains, as well. Finally, the attention-based view of the
firm also suggests that organizations tend to continue in existing domains where they previously
and currently focus attention. As a result of inertial forces associated with attention, where the
organization directed its attention in the past is likely to be seen in the present (Ocasio, 2011).
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As such, this study proposes a positive relationship between previous attention to competitive
and cooperative behaviors and current competitive and cooperative behaviors, respectively.

Figure 1.1: Research Model

While the attention-based view suggests that focusing attention on competition and
cooperation will increase the likelihood of these types of actions, this study extends that
relationship to assess how the attention to and enactment of these actions influences firm
performance. A core tenet of the attention-based view of the firm is derived from the concept of
bounded rationality (Simon, 1947), and the theory suggests that firms have limited amounts of
attention to direct towards different organizational issues and actions. This study proposes a
curvilinear relationship between both competition and cooperation and subsequent firm
performance due to the inherent attention constraints of the organization. As a firm increases the
number of competitive and cooperative behaviors, it is proposed here that the positive
relationship does not continue infinitely but has diminishing returns. Bounded rationality and the
development and application of heuristics both support this argument by suggesting that as a firm
8

tries to direct attention to too many actions and behaviors, the firm will not be able to effectively
(1) manage the variety of actions and (2) focus and maximize the utility of each type of action of
the firm.
While this study contributes to both the competition and cooperation literature by
identifying organizational attention as an important predictor of these behaviors and how this
influences performance, it also contributes to the literature by integrating both of these
phenomena as potentially interdependent behaviors (Chen, 2008). The logic presented in the
ambidexterity literature, though often applied to the concepts of exploration and exploitation,
provide valuable insight into how the balance of what may be seen as conflicting behaviors can
be mutually beneficial (Lewis, 2000). Ambidexterity logic proposes that, in order to outperform
competitors, a firm must balance the demands for new innovation and exploiting existing
resources and competencies (He & Wong, 2004). The relationship between exploration and
exploitation has seen ample attention from researchers (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008); however,
the logic of ambidexterity and empirical examination of the nature of the relationship between
competition and cooperation has been scarce. The present study takes an important first step to
identifying if and how the balance of competition and cooperation influences a firm’s
performance through the lens of ambidexterity.
This study also proposes the relationships between competition and cooperation and
performance are likely to be influenced by the type or variety of firm actions. For example, as a
firm engages in a variety of types of actions, these actions may require too much of the firm’s
limited resources. As such, the firm’s performance may deteriorate faster with a more diverse
portfolio of competitive and cooperative actions (Ferrier & Lyon, 2004). In essence, firms may
struggle to maximize the value associated with these behaviors due to being stretched too thin.

9

Not only does this study provide an initial empirical examination of competition and cooperation
balance, it also breaks ground on identifying and testing important contingencies that are likely
to influence the main effect relationship.
Based on the previous discussion the purpose of this research is to examine a holistic
model of organizational attention, how this attention is manifested in firm behaviors, and how
these behaviors influence a firm’s performance. As such, the goals of this research can be
summarized as:
(1) Does the attention-based view of the firm predict competitive and cooperative
actions?
(2) Does the independent level of competition and cooperation influence firm
performance?
(3) Does type of competitive or cooperative action influence the relationship between
competition/cooperation and performance?
(4) Does the integrative balance of competitive and cooperative actions influence a
firm’s performance?
Methodology Overview
In order to test the relationships and model presented above, this study presents a test of
organizational attention, nature and number of competitive and cooperative actions, and firm
performance. To assess the research model, it is necessary to identify and analyze contexts in
which competition and cooperation are common behaviors. As such, the sample is drawn from
industries characterized by these actions. The data is collected from a longitudinal sample of 15
medical device manufacturing firms and 15 oil and gas field services firms across the 10-year
period ranging from 2003-2013. This sample provides a unique context in which to study the
effects of attention and competitive and cooperative behaviors on firm performance. Content
analysis is conducted and applied to annual reports as well as news reports, coupled with
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cooperation data from the SDC Platinum database and financial metrics available from
Compustat. Measures used in the study have been derived from existing literature, while new
measures have also been developed and applied to examine constructs that have yet to be
empirically assessed in the existing literature. The relationships within the model are analyzed
using OLS regression to examine both linear and non-linear relationships.
Conclusion
The present study proposes several contributions to both competition and cooperation
literature, and also contributes to and extends the theoretical bounds of the attention-based view
of the firm and ambidexterity literature. First, this study identifies and assesses the potential for
a curvilinear relationship between both competition and cooperation and subsequent firm
performance. It is proposed, based on the concept of bounded rationality and misappropriated
heuristics (Cyert & March, 1963; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999), that attentional constraints of
the firm limit a firm’s ability to capitalize on competitive and cooperative actions. It also
suggests diversity of competitive and cooperative actions as an important moderator of the
curvilinear relationships proposed. Second, this study takes an initial examination of how the
balance between competition and cooperation influences a firm’s performance. Third, it
contributes theoretically to both the attention-based view of the firm and also the ambidexterity
literature. This study is one of the first to address the organizational attention that is theorized in
Ocasio’s (1997) initial conceptualization of the attention-based view of the firm. It also extends
the logic of ambidexterity to a related domain by translating the insights associated with the
exploration-exploitation balance to a similar conceptualization of seemingly opposing constructs
of competition and cooperation (Gupta et al., 2006). By addressing the questions and
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relationships proposed in the research model, this study is expected to make theoretical and
conceptual contributions to the field of strategic management.
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CHAPTER 2: THEORY AND LITERATURE OVERVIEW
In order to understand the nature of competitive and cooperative behaviors of the firm, it
is important to understand the theories and logical frameworks that have been applied and
developed in the separate research domains of competition and cooperation. It is also important
to identify and assess the theoretical rationale applied to the existing, but limited, research that
assesses these two behaviors simultaneously. The existing literature assessing competition and
cooperation provides a useful understanding of the state of both domains, and also identifies
opportunities for future analysis and integration.
This chapter provides a review of the relevant literature that identifies the current state of
both the research on competition and cooperation, as well as an overview of the attention-based
view and ambidexterity literature. By coupling the literature associated with competition and
cooperation with the current state of the attention-based view of the firm and ambidexterity
literature, this study proposes contributions to both of the research domains of competition and
cooperation and theory extension and application. The review leads to the identification of a
research opportunity that integrates both research domains with new theories that provide the
logical framework necessary, and appropriate, for understanding how firms manage and
capitalize on competition and cooperation simultaneously.
Relevant Competition Literature Overview
As one of the central tenets and foundational cornerstones of strategic management
research, competition has been the focus of ample amounts of scholarly inquiry and analysis
(Baum & Korn, 1996; Miller, 1996; Smith, Ferrier, & Ndofor, 2001). Considering the
fundamental role competition plays in strategic management, scholars have identified and
analyzed phenomena from an external perspective, as well as an internal perspective in order to
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understand the motivations for, and the outcomes of, competitive behavior (Ferrier, 2001;
Ketchen et al., 2004). While the phenomenon of competition has been heavily studied,
numerous opportunities exist to extend, integrate, and contribute to the existing literature. In this
section, an overview of the relevant prior research and theoretical logics will be reviewed,
followed by the identification of opportunities and research objectives addressed by the current
research study. The review of the literature is summarized in Table 2.1.
From a theoretical perspective, a variety of frameworks and logics have been applied to
understand the phenomenon of competition. Many are grounded in internal aspects of the firm
such as the resource-based view (Barney, 1991) and dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano, &
Shuen, 1997); however, the dominant theories that have been applied from an external
perspective have been drawn from areas such as industrial economics (Porter, 1980), game
theory (Nalebuff & Brandenburger, 1996), and network theory (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). While
these theoretical frameworks are all unique, the majority of recent competition research has
fallen under the broad umbrella of competitive dynamics—the study of an interactive and
dynamic exchange of behaviors among rivals (Chen & Miller, 2012).
Derived from Austrian Economics and work by Schumpeter (1934), competitive
dynamics are largely motivated by the balance between external demands and internal
capabilities of the firm. In essence, competitive dynamics suggests that a competitive advantage
is a result of factors both internal and external to the firm (Smith et al., 2001). As a result, firms
that are able to identify and engage in competitive actions that address external issues, and also
acquire and manage resources necessary to enact and capitalize on these actions are likely to
have higher levels of performance (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). While this overview of theories
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applied to competition provide a foundation of understanding how the research has developed,
externally and internally oriented theories will be further examined below.
Competition has been analyzed using a variety of lenses, one of which includes a focus
on the external factors that influence competitive behaviors of the firm. At the dawn of strategic
management, many scholars translated economic concepts and theories to understand how firms
behave and what provides firms with competitive advantages over peers. One such broad
theoretical lens applied is derived from the IO-Economics perspective provided by Porter (1980).
Work drawing from this theoretical framework identified external factors such as industry
characteristics and macro-economic conditions that determine the extent to which competitive
actions would lead to positive performance outcomes (Khanna & Palepu, 2002). For example,
industry growth, the presence and concentration of competitors, the nature of industry
dependencies, and the barriers to entry and exit of the industry defined the landscape and
competitive conditions firms had to manage in order to survive and thrive among competitors
(Derfus, Maggitti, Grimm, & Smith, 2008; Ferrier, 2001).
A second theory that has been leveraged that has an externally-oriented scope is found in
network theory (Tsai, 2002). In essence, network theory focuses attention on how firms engage
and manage their relative positioning among peers within a larger network of organizations
(Gimeno, 2004). Common themes addressed in this literature include the identification of and
value capture associated with structural holes, top management team (TMT) social networks, as
well as the firm’s relative positioning among competitors as key determinants of performance of
the firm (Ahuja, 2000). While this research offers valuable insights into competition, it provides
a relatively deterministic perspective of competition that lacks an understanding of how firm
characteristics and actions shape competitive advantage. As firms continue to manage and adapt
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to external contingencies, theories that address external issues alongside internal factors will be
critical to understanding the nature of competition as the research within this stream continues to
develop and grow.
While research applying IO-Economic principles and theories focuses the lens of
attention towards the external environment, other theories have focused attention towards the
internal determinants of competitive behaviors and subsequent performance. Two such theories
can be found in the foundational logic of RBV and also research applying insights from dynamic
capabilities. RBV proposes that organizations engage in competitive behaviors and develop
competitive advantages based on the extent to which they are able to acquire and leverage
valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable resources (Barney, 1991). This research has
been extended by researchers that suggest resource orchestration—the ability to not only possess
the resources, but also manage them effectively—is an important determinant of a firm’s ability
to develop and maintain a competitive advantage (Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland, & Gilbert, 2011).
Specific to the competition literature, the act of ‘leveraging’ resources from the resource
orchestration literature supports the notion that internal resources of the firm are tied directly to
the competitive actions and behaviors of the firm (Ndofor et al., 2011).
Second, dynamic capabilities extends the internal perspective by addressing how firms
manage the changing demands of the external environment by adapting their internal
characteristics to improve the fit between the expectations of the environment and the internal
resources and structure of the firm (Teece et al., 1997). Dynamic capabilities research suggests
that firms are able to develop and change their resources to maintain a competitive advantage
over peers (Easterby‐Smith, Lyles, & Peteraf, 2009). As firms alter their resource structuring
and application, they are able to enact competitive actions and develop or maintain a competitive
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advantage (Sirmon, Hitt, Arregle, & Campbell, 2010). While internally and externally oriented
theories have been applied to understand competition and performance of the firm, recent work
has sought to focus on a more integrative approach to understanding the competitionperformance relationship.
Competitive dynamics represents a broad domain of research that examines the
interaction of the internal and external environment on competition. One of the core elements of
competitive dynamics is the identification and analysis of tacit competitive actions. The unit of
analysis has shifted from the IO Economics analysis of industry or strategic group
characteristics, and focused more attention on understanding the specific competitive actions and
reactions that firms implement (Ferrier et al., 1999; Miller & Chen, 1994; Smith, Grimm, &
Gannon, 1992). By identifying and analyzing the specific actions of the firm, researchers have
focused the lens of research on a behavior that can be uniquely assessed in terms of how it relates
to both internal firm characteristics like attention and external factors, as well. In other words,
actions of the firm can be identified based on internal motivations and capabilities, but also how
these actions are manifested and the subsequent implications and outcomes that are realized in
the external environment (Parmar et al., 2010). These can be actions that spawn reactions of
other firms, or they can provide the firm with a stronger relative positioning in terms of market
positioning and market share (Derfus et al., 2008; Tsai, Su, & Chen, 2011). Also, the actions
enacted by the firm are likely manifestations of a firm’s intended strategies and the direction in
which the firm intends to propel the organization (Andrews, 1971). By shifting the analysis of
competition from purely external contingencies or internal capabilities, developing and applying
research that focuses on the actions of firms provides a strong operationalization of how internal
and external factors relate to one another.
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Table 2.1: Competition Literature
Theoretical
Foundation
IOEconomics

Orientation
External

Predictions
Industry
conditions and
structural
elements
determine
competition and
performance

Competition Issues
Multipoint
Competition, industry
barriers, growth, and
concentration
influence competitive
behaviors

Recent Literature
Upson, Ketchen,
Connelly, & Ranft,
2012; Yu &
Cannella, 2007

ResourceInternal
Based View

Firm resources
determine
competition and
performance

Possession and
leveraging of VRIN
resources improves
effectiveness of
competitive
behaviors

Ndofor, Sirmon, &
He, 2011; Sirmon,
Gove, & Hitt, 2008

Dynamic
Capabilities

Internal

Firms that manage
the changes of the
environment will
enact better
competitive
behaviors and
have stronger
performance

Managing a firm’s
resources/structure in
a dynamic
environment
improves competitive
effectiveness

Easterby-Smith,
Lyles, & Peteraf,
2009; Sirmon, Hitt,
Arregle, &
Campbell, 2010

Network
Theory

External

A firm’s relative
positioning within
a network of peers
influences
competitive
behaviors

Structural holes,
TMT characteristics,
network positioning
determine
competitive
behaviors

Gnyawali &
Madhavan, 2001;
Tsai, 2002

Interactions
among internal
and external
forces shape
competitive
behaviors of the
firm

Core issues include
(1) time (sequencing,
spacing, duration of
actions) and (2)
change
(environmental shifts,
competitor behaviors,
external and internal
forces)

Ferrier & Lee, 2002;
Smith, Ferrier, &
Ndofor 2001; Tsai,
Su, & Chen, 2011

Competitive Integrative
Dynamics
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This study seeks to extend competition research and the competitive dynamics domain by
applying the attention-based view of the firm and logic from the ambidexterity literature. ABV
captures elements of the external and internal environment by identifying the issues
(environmental factors) that the organization directs attention (a finite internal factor) towards,
and how this attention is manifested in tacit and identifiable firm behaviors (Ocasio, 1997).
Second, ambidexterity provides a strong logical framework that can shed light on how
competition may have an interactive relationship with a related yet contradictory behavior such
as cooperation (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). The logical tenets of ambidexterity provide a
strong foundation that identifies the paradoxical nature of actions and how these actions may be
interdependent rather than independent.
This study contributes to the current literature by extending this perspective of
competition as a dynamic interaction of internal and external factors. By analyzing the
competitive actions of the firm, this study captures specific and tangible behaviors of the firm
that are a result of a firm’s internal processes and external contingencies that influence the
effectiveness of these actions. Also, by analyzing a similar phenomenon—cooperation—
simultaneously, this study provides cross-disciplinary contributions that can bridge a gap
between two types of actions often discussed, yet seldom assessed, simultaneously. The
following section provides a similar review of the existing cooperation literature, as well as
proposes possible integration between the two domains of research.
Relevant Cooperation Literature Review
A second pillar on which the foundation of strategic management is set can be found in
the research on cooperation. Interorganizational relationships (IORs) have also seen a variety of
theoretical frameworks applied within the overarching domain of cooperation. By leveraging
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multiple theories and addressing unique cooperative actions, from the motivations of cooperation
to the implications and outcomes associated with interorganizational relationships, cooperation
research has provided numerous valuable contributions to strategic management. Similar to the
competition literature, cooperation research has flourished and continues to grow; however, there
also exist opportunities to extend our knowledge associated with how cooperation is managed
and influences firm performance. The review of the cooperation literature is summarized in
Table 2.2.
Theories that address the cooperation among firms have largely been derived from
transaction cost economics (TCE) and the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) (Barney, 1991;
Williamson, 1981). Within each of these domains, separate theoretical streams have developed
such as agency theory within TCE, and knowledge-based view of the firm within the RBV
perspective (Eisenhardt, 1989; Grant, 1996). While these theories address the unique elements
associated with specific IORs, research focusing on portfolios of cooperative relationships of
firms has also developed. This portfolio perspective is largely grounded in social network
theory, and also organizational learning literature (Ahuja, 2000; Deeds & Hill, 1996). The
history of theoretical frameworks applied to cooperative behaviors of the firm will be briefly
discussed and reviewed below.
Since cooperation research necessitates the existence and interaction of at least two firms,
researchers have identified, applied, and extended theories that capture the motivation for and
nature of cooperation among firms. Like the theory applied in the competition literature, early
foundational work in cooperation translated economic principles and theories to the strategic
management context as a starting point for the relatively new field of inquiry. The main example
of this is found in the application and development of transaction cost theory (TCT) in strategic
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management research (Williamson, 1981). At the core of TCT is the ‘make-or-buy’ decision
which—in the context of cooperation—is defined by the expected and realized costs associated
with engaging in cooperation with another organization (Masten & Saussier, 2000). Cooperation
offers firms an alternative to the market or hierarchy with more control than purely market
transactions but also less control than bringing the behavior completely into the firm (Geyskens,
Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006).
TCT research has provided a strong foundation that has commonly been leveraged to
explore the nature of dyadic relationships, and scholars that have applied this theoretical
framework have provided invaluable contributions to the field’s understanding of (1) what
motivates transacting relationships among firms and (2) rich insights into the inner workings
associated with specific relationships between organizations (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos,
2011). The main focus of this research has been used to understand the unique elements and
factors associated with specific relationships. For example, researchers have assessed how
organizations identify, engage, and manage relationships based on similarities, costs, and
ambiguity within the relationship and the overall environment (David & Han, 2004). A
subsidiary theoretical framework of TCT that has been applied to cooperation is found in agency
theory (Kim & Mahoney, 2005). Like TCT, agency theory is often leveraged in contexts that are
specific to individual relationships between firms, and assesses the extent to which agency costs
shape relationships and develop over time (Blair & Lafontaine, 2005). While these two
theoretical frameworks are often applied, the focus of these theories is on the individual
relationships, rather than the nature of a firm’s overall cooperative activity.
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Table 2.2: Cooperation Literature
Theoretical
Foundation
Transaction
Cost
Theory

Orientation
Relationship

Recent
Literature
Carter &
Hodgson, 2006;
David & Han,
2004;
Geyskens,
Steenkamp, &
Kumar 2006

Predictions
Market or hierarchy
decisions are made
based on expected
costs associated with
IOR

Cooperation Issues
Largely focused on
dyads. Costs, asset
specificity, ambiguity
influence the decision
to ‘make-or-buy’

ResourceInternal
Based View

Resources the firm
possesses, and
resources the firm
needs influence IORs

Firm resource needs,
complementarity, and
opportunities to
leverage existing
resources influence
IOR decisions

Rivera-Santos
& Inkpen, 2009;
Zaheer & Bell,
2005

Knowledge
-Based
View

Internal

Substream of RBV
that posits
knowledge is a
necessary resource
for firms to achieve
competitive
advantage

Firms engage in IORs
to acquire or develop
new knowledge and
leverage existing
knowledge

Draulans, de
Man, &
Volberda, 2003;
Kale, Dyer, &
Singh, 2002

Agency
Theory

Relationship

Substream of
Transaction Cost
Theory that
emphasizes the
importance of
ownership, rewards,
and authority

Focuses on nature of
contracts and IOR
negotiations in dyads
to ascertain the extent
to which agency costs
influence cooperative
behaviors

Blair &
Lafontaine,
2005; Reuer &
Ragozzino,
2006

Network
Theory

External

A firm’s IORs
embed the
organization among
network peers, and
this positioning
determines a firm’s
ability to capture
value from IORs

Positioning and
embeddedness within
a network (often at the
network level)
determine the
performance of firms
within a given
network

Koka &
Prescott, 2008;
Provan, Fish, &
Sydow, 2007
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TCT and agency theory provide rich insights into the details associated with individual
dyadic relationships; however, other theoretical frameworks have been leveraged that assess a
broader level of cooperation of the firm. Rather than focusing solely on the intricacies associated
within dyadic relationships, theories such as RBV, knowledge-based view of the firm, and
network theory have been applied to understand why and how firms engage in multiple
cooperative engagements simultaneously. RBV and the knowledge-based view of the firm,
suggest that firms engage in interorganizational relationships to acquire and/or develop core
competencies to create and capture value for the firm (Poppo & Zenger, 1998; Rivera-Santos &
Inkpen, 2009). While the focus of RBV is broader and captures diverse resources, the
knowledge-based view of the firm focuses on understanding how firms go about acquiring and
leveraging knowledge resources and human capital as a means of developing competitive
advantages (Van Wijk, Jansen, & Lyles, 2008). These two theories focus attention inward when
determining what motivates a firm to engage in cooperate activity, and doesn’t necessarily
address the management of a firm’s holistic cooperative engagements.
Rather than focusing on the internal nature of cooperative activity, network theory has
largely focused on an external or structural approach to understanding cooperative action
(Borgatti & Foster, 2003). Network theory has assessed cooperative actions of organizations and
examines the extent to which a firm’s positioning within a network of organizations influences
performance (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003). Research applying network theory often assesses
performance at the network level, and often lacks the insights associated with firm-level research
by focusing at the network-level of analysis of cooperation (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011).
RBV, knowledge-based view of the firm, and network theory represent three theoretical
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frameworks that have focused attention on cooperation beyond the dyad and provide a strong
foundation for other areas of inquiry such as alliance portfolio research.
As a relatively new substream within the cooperation literature, alliance portfolio
research has become quickly established as a research topic partly due to the appropriate and
strong application of theory to the phenomenon of interest (Wassmer, 2010). Within the alliance
portfolio management literature studies have focused on understanding how a firm’s position in a
network lends itself to a better competitive advantage relative to peers due to access to resources,
knowledge, markets, among numerous other network-derived benefits (Baum, Calabrese, &
Silverman, 2000; Capaldo, 2007; Goerzen, 2007). A second focal area of research has been
targeted at understanding how firms capture the value associated with multiple different
cooperative relationships. Falling under the domain of organizational learning, this research has
sought to shed light on how firms can create and capture value from a holistic perspective in
terms of alliance portfolio management (Lavie, 2007). Again, this research focuses on
understanding how resources, both within the firm and through IORs, are critical to the success
of the organization. While these fall under the broad domain of cooperation research, these
subcategories within cooperation research focus understanding how firms manage the entire set
of IORs rather than the unique characteristics of individual relationships between firms.
While portfolio research has been relatively popular within recent years, many
opportunities to extend the literature exist. While early stage research examined the implications
of size of cooperative portfolios, many researchers have suggested these studies have merely
scratched the surface with other opportunities to explore how the size of a portfolio is managed
by the firm (Deeds & Hill, 1996; Goerzen, 2007). By extending this research to address
potential curvilinear effects, and also examining internal and external factors simultaneously, this
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study offers a valuable and insightful contribution to the existing literature. Also, many of the
theories applied to the cooperative activity of firms have been limited to understanding what
motivates a firm to engage in cooperation, or the way firms manage individual cooperative
engagements. The proposed study extends cooperation research by leveraging attention-based
view of the firm and theoretical insights from the ambidexterity literature to explore if a firm
manages multiple cooperative engagements simultaneously, and if attention influences a firm’s
ability to capture value from their cooperative portfolio.
Attention Based View of the Firm
The attention-based view of the firm (ABV) is a theoretical framework aimed broadly at
understanding the nature of attention within the firm and how this influences a firm’s decisions
and actions (Ocasio, 1997). This theoretical approach focuses on answering how, why, when,
and who within the organization addresses specific issues, and how the firm’s attention to these
issues results in subsequent activity (Ocasio, 2011). One of the core tenets that is particularly
relevant to understanding firm behavior lies in the concept of bounded rationality, which posits
that firms have limited amounts of attention that can be leveraged at any given time (Cyert &
March, 1963). Since attention of the firm and individuals within the firm are finite resources, the
actions firms enact are likely to be strongly related to the issues the firm chooses to focus
attention towards (Sapienza, De Clercq, & Sandberg, 2005). Below, a brief summary of research
leveraging the attention-based view of the firm is summarized, followed by how it provides a
relevant and appropriate framework for understanding competitive and cooperative actions of the
firm.
In Ocasio’s (1997) seminal work establishing and developing the attention-based view of
the firm, he proposed that the structuring and direction of attention of the firm represents a
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critical and centrally important predictor of firm behavior (Simon, 1947). By reengaging and
reviving earlier concepts of structure and cognition, the ABV perspective establishes attention at
the organizational level and suggests that organizational attention—as manifested in the patterns
of attention directed by managers—is a strong predictor of firm actions (Ren & Guo, 2011). The
three focal elements of ABV are:
(1) The focus of attention—what issues are being identified and engaged by
managers?
(2) Situated attention—how does context (or other factors) influence what issues
receive attention?
(3) Structural distribution of attention—how do resources, rules, and control
within the organization influence the allocation of attention and subsequent
enactment of behaviors?
While these three elements represent the holistic model associated with ABV, traditionally
researchers have focused on identifying elements of each subcategory in order to understand firm
behavior (Rerup, 2009). For example, research applying ABV has often leveraged letters to
shareholders as being indicative of issues and topics that the firm is focusing attention towards
and hoping to address with subsequent firm actions.
While previous empirical research has provided valuable insight about how attention
influences firm decisions, opportunities to extend the literature still exist. One such opportunity
exists in the empirical examination of organizational level attention (Cho & Hambrick, 2006).
Previous research has largely focused on assessing and analyzing the attention associated with
individuals within the firm, rather than assessing the firm’s overall allocation of attention
(Kaplan, 2008). While previous research applying ABV has traditionally focused on assessing
individual level measurement of attention (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009), the future of ABV lies in the
integration and simultaneous assessment of individual and organizational level attention (Ocasio
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& Joseph, 2005). By focusing attention on how organizational attention is manifested in actions
and its subsequent influence on performance, this study provides valuable contributions to the
ABV literature.
This study also makes a strong contribution and extends the ABV literature by integrating
and analyzing tangible and relevant outcome variables. Previous research leveraging ABV has
traditionally only assessed the extent to which attention influences firm actions (Ocasio, 2011).
While this is a useful contribution to the literature and offers strong insights as to how firms
behave, it lacks a stronger connection to the strategic management research at large. This study
proposes a mediated relationship between attention and firm performance—a dependent variable
that lies at the core of strategic management (Nag et al., 2007). By empirically assessing the
proposed research model, this study provides a strong link between ABV and the broader field of
strategic management.
Ambidexterity
The concept of organizational ambidexterity has become a popular topic of study for
management scholars. Since the seminal work by March (1991), researchers have focused on
understanding the unique relationship between exploration and exploitation behaviors of the
firm. Exploration behaviors are identified and generally defined as behaviors focused on
learning and/or innovating, whereas exploitation behaviors are traditionally viewed as behaviors
that leverage or apply previous knowledge, resources, or skills (March, 1991). While this
balance of exploration and exploitation is the domain in which the concept of ambidexterity was
born, the logic and rationale behind ambidexterity can be leveraged in the unique context of how
firms manage and balance cooperation and competitive actions, as well.
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In terms of parallels, the exploration-exploitation balance is closely related to the
discussion that exists in the current literature in regards to competition and cooperation. Namely,
researchers are interested in studying and understanding the extent to which competitive and
cooperative activity are related, and if they are related, to what extent. In essence, the question
still remains as to whether competition and cooperation are loosely related to each other, or if
these two actions are mutually exclusive (Park, Srivastava, & Gnyawali, 2013). This debate
strongly parallels the discussions that have been applied in the exploration-exploitation realm
(Gupta et al., 2006). Questions regarding the extent to which competition and cooperation exist
on two ends of a continuum or exist as orthogonal constructs that are relatively independent of
each other continue to be identified as critical future research opportunities but have yet to attract
thorough empirical analysis (Chen, 2008).
A second parallel exists between the two literatures in terms of the sequencing or balance
associated with competition and cooperation. For example, what levels and types of competitive
and cooperative actions are likely to yield the highest levels of firm performance? How do
external contingencies influence the “appropriate” balance that optimizes performance in a given
context? These questions continue to permeate the ambidexterity literature, and again have a
clear similarity to the debate and discussion within the cooperation and competition literature
(Benner & Tushman, 2003; Burgelman, 2002; Raisch, Birkinshaw, Probst, & Tushman, 2009).
The need for both competition and cooperation has received ample support in each independent
domain; however, the need for integration and the understanding of how the firm should balance
these actions simultaneously or sequentially represents a critical question that can only be
addressed by cross-disciplinary research that applies insights from both independent research
streams.
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The application of ambidexterity to the proposed study is not to examine the debate
between exploration and exploitation. The purpose of applying ambidexterity to the proposed
study is to leverage the underlying logic associated with research in the ambidexterity literature.
As such, this study focuses on understanding the foundational elements of ambidexterity—the
concept of paradox, and the balance of paradoxical behaviors—in the context of competition and
cooperation. While ambidexterity has been limited to exploration and exploitation, the proposed
study makes a first step in translating the logic associated with ambidexterity to a new context.
By applying the concepts of paradox and the balance associated with managing potentially
conflicting behaviors to the competition/cooperation phenomenon, this study extends and
strengthens the existing ambidexterity literature.
Integration of Theory and Phenomena
The study being proposed here provides contributions and integration of unique domains
of research, and it also extends and tests the theories discussed above. The research model
presented answers a call to research for integration of competition and cooperation, while also
applying and extending new theories to the phenomenon of interest. By integrating the related
yet independent research streams of competition and cooperation, this research provides an
initial framework for examining these two types of phenomena simultaneously (Chen, 2008).
Also, this study applies, integrates, and extends the theoretical insights that can be drawn from
the growing literature on the attention-based view of the firm and the study of organizational
ambidexterity.
Having assessed the historical development of competition and cooperation literatures, as
well as providing an overview of the attention-based view of the firm and the ambidexterity
literature, the focus of the following section is to integrate the theoretical frameworks with the
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phenomena being assessed. Previous discussions identified the gaps within each specific
domain; however, the focus of this section is to identify how the proposed study fits with and
contributes to each research stream, while discussing and assessing how this research integrates
elements from each area to fit the overall research model. This study proposes new contributions
to competition and cooperation, while simultaneously extending the application of ABV and the
logic found in the ambidexterity literature to new phenomena.
In order to explain how the proposed study plans to contribute to the literature, it is best
to review the gaps that were identified in previous sections as well as the current state of research
in each domain. First, this study seeks to contribute to both competition and cooperation
literatures by empirically assessing the extent to which firm actions are shaped by where and
how a firm directs attention towards issues. Research addressing how attention influences the
competitive and cooperative behaviors and subsequent performance of the firm represents a
strong contribution by integrating a key predictor of how firms manage and attend to competitive
and cooperative issues. This integrative contribution extends the application of ABV, while also
providing a strong theoretical framework for understanding competitive and cooperative
behaviors of the firm simultaneously. By integrating insights from ABV and ambidexterity
research, this study provides a unique perspective that assesses internal and external factors
associated with competitive and cooperative actions simultaneously. This holistic model aligns
well with the recent trends in the development of ABV and ambidexterity, as well as the
continuing development of competitive and cooperative research. Table 2.3 provides a brief
summary of both competition and cooperation research and the theoretical frameworks being
applied.
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Topic
Competition

Table 2.3: Literature Summary
Prior Research Topics
Current and Future Research
Topics
Environmental characteristics,
Competitive behaviors,
industry characteristics, resources integration of internal and
of the firm, management of
external factors, potential
resources of the firm
interactions with cooperation

Cooperation

Dyadic relationships, relationship
issues (costs, negotiations,
contracts, etc.), network
structure, network positioning

Alliance portfolios,
integrating micro-elements
into cooperation research,
potential interactions with
competition

Attention-Based View of
the Firm

Individual attention to
identifiable behaviors, how
attention focus shapes behaviors,
attention manifested in
organization structure

Identifying relationships
between individual attention
and organizational factors or
outcomes, application to more
holistic models

Ambidexterity

Exploration and exploitation,
variation of focus on exploration
or exploitation influencing
performance, industry
characteristics

Examining the nature of the
relationship between
paradoxical behaviors,
extension to new domains

In terms of contributions to competition and cooperation, this research makes
contributions to both research streams independently but also integratively. From a competitive
dynamics perspective this research proposes an empirical examination of potential curvilinear
effects associated with competition, and it continues within the existing research by examining
specific actions overall as indicative of the firm’s competitive strategies (Ketchen et al., 2004).
From a cooperative research perspective this research again fits into the current literature by
addressing the cooperative behaviors of the firm overall and moves beyond dyadic relationships
to understand how firms’ cooperative behaviors influence performance (Wassmer, 2010).
Finally, the proposed research also identifies the balance of competition and cooperation as an
important starting point to understanding the nature of the relationship of competitive and
cooperative activity, and also the extent to which this balance influences performance
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(Bengtsson & Kock, 2014). The contributions to each area of research are discussed below,
followed by how this study proposes integrating the phenomena of interest with the theoretical
frameworks being leveraged.
Specific to the competition literature, researchers have called for a stronger integration of
micro issues (like attention) to further understand how and why firms engage in competitive
behaviors. By leveraging ABV, this study proposes not only cross-disciplinary contributions by
integrating cooperation as a potentially conflicting demand for the finite attention of the firm
(Cyert & March, 1963), but also integrating micro-level concepts as critical determinants in a
firm’s competitive and cooperative decision-making (Chen, 2008). Further, this study
contributes to the competition literature by looking at antecedents and outcomes of competitive
behaviors simultaneously. As a holistic model, this study seeks to determine how competition is
enacted based on the direction of attention of organizational members and how this influences
the firm’s ability to gain and/or sustain a competitive advantage.
Specific to the cooperation literature, this study extends the growing literature on
assessing a firm’s cooperative behaviors at the firm level as opposed to the dyad level. By
positioning this study in the existing literature that examines a firm’s cooperative actions
holistically (Wassmer, 2010), it fits well within the current discussion while also integrating
competition as a potential factor that may influence the extent to which a firm is able to engage
in and capture value associated with cooperation. ABV provides a unique and strong theoretical
lens to understanding how a firm directs and manages attention to cooperation, and how this
attention to cooperation influences cooperative actions and subsequent performance. Also, the
logic and theoretical framework presented in the ambidexterity literature provides insight as to
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how competition and cooperation as seemingly paradoxical behaviors may have interactive
effects on each other. These theories are discussed in further detail below.
The attention-based view of the firm has been leveraged to understand how the focus of
finite attention influences firm actions. Previous research leveraging the attention-based view of
the firm has largely focused on understanding how attention influences behaviors (Ocasio,
2011); however, this study tests that relationship while also extending the relationship to include
performance implications, as well. By integrating these moderating effects, it provides a
stronger representation of how attention directly impacts an organization’s behaviors and
indirectly impacts performance. The proposed study also extends the ABV literature by
empirically assessing the concept of bounded rationality and the finite nature of attention within
the firm. This study provides an initial attempt to assess how attentional limitations affect firm
performance. It also examines the performance implications associated with the development
and management of heuristics. By applying the attention-based view to the context of
competition and cooperation, this study contributes to the growing literature that integrates micro
and macro concepts to more holistically understand phenomena.
While the above discussion explains how this study contributes to the domains of
competition and cooperation individually, the study also makes integrative contributions that are
informed by the logic proposed in the ambidexterity literature. The attention-based view
provides the theoretical foundation for the individual competitive and cooperative elements of
the research model; however, ambidexterity serves as the binding logic that integrates the two
types of actions and suggests that these two divergent actions may be related (March, 1991).
While ambidexterity has traditionally been applied to exploration and exploitation, many of the
logical rationales and frameworks applied in the exploration-exploitation debate have parallels
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with the discussion involving competition and cooperation. As discussed in the previous section,
the questions revolving around the ambidexterity literature about the nature of exploration and
exploitation strongly parallel the issues and questions that plague the competition and
cooperation literatures (Gupta et al., 2006). For example, are competition and cooperation
mutually exclusive, or relatively independent and orthogonal? By leveraging the theoretical
insights from ambidexterity, this study contributes and extends the ambidexterity to a similar
context while simultaneously providing the theoretical foundation for the integration of
competition and cooperation in the research model.
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CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
While the focus of the previous chapters is to (1) outline the overall scope of the
proposed study and (2) offer a background of extant competition and cooperation research and
theory that might shed new light into this research, the purpose of the current chapter is to
leverage the theory to offer specific hypotheses. Specifically, the purpose is to (1) identify the
nature of the relationships being examined, and (2) explain and apply the theory, logic, and prior
research that support the relationships being proposed and assessed. By integrating and applying
insights discussed previously, this chapter provides the necessary link between theory and
phenomena to support the research model.
To recall, the questions and issues identified in the earlier sections focused on
understanding the nature of competition and cooperation within the firm, and how these two
types of actions independently and integratively influence firm performance. The driving
theoretical frameworks being leveraged to understand the dynamics associated with these
seemingly paradoxical actions are drawn from the attention based view and the ambidexterity
literature. By examining this holistic model of attention of the organization, the behavioral
results of where this attention is focused and directed, and also the performance implications of
these actions, the proposed model addresses the following questions:
(1) Does the attention-based view of the firm predict competitive and cooperative
actions?
(2) Does the independent level of competition and cooperation influence firm
performance?
(3) Does diversity of competitive or cooperative action influence the relationship
between competition/cooperation and performance?
(4) Does the integrative balance of competitive and cooperative actions influence a
firm’s performance?

35

Research Model

Figure 3.1: Research Model, Reviewed
Attention’s Influence on Actions
Examining the effects of attention on actions of individuals and organizations has long
been a popular topic of inquiry for both micro and macro scholars in the field of management
(Cyert & March, 1963; Sullivan, 2010). The cognitive nature of attention within the firm lends
itself to a unique context where integration of micro and macro factors provides a rich
explanation of how and why firms engage in certain behaviors. Attention is represented by the
extent to which firms and individuals dedicate time and effort on issues and answers associated
with characteristics of the firm and environment (Ocasio, 1997). The attention based view of the
firm posits that the three key elements to understanding the relationship between attention and
actions lie in (1) the focus of attention—issues and answers that receive attention are likely to be
acted on, (2) the way attention is situated—contextual and situational features determine how
attention is applied, and (3) the structural nature of attention—how a firm is structured or
situated among peers influences the extent to which different issues and answers attract attention
and subsequent action. While research has examined the separate elements of ABV, the current
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study seeks to understand how (1) the focus of attention and (2) the situated nature of attention
relative to competition and cooperation shape competitive and cooperative activity, while
controlling for the effects of structural characteristics of attention within the organization.
The attention based view has been leveraged in a variety of studies with the intention of
understanding how focusing attention on certain issues and answers result in firm actions related
to a given phenomenon. Much of the research has been conducted at the executive level of the
organization, and focused on understanding how managerial attention determines the firm’s
behaviors (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Ocasio & Joseph, 2008). While these studies provide a
unique perspective on how firm actions are influenced by executive attention, it often fails to
connect the attention of the organization and its members to the actions of the organization.
Rather than solely examining how executives influence a firm’s actions, the current study
extends the attention-based view to ascertain the extent to which an organization focuses the
attention of its organizational members on competition and cooperation to understand what types
of actions are enacted by the firm. Also, while previous research has focused on understanding
the effects of executive attention on individual actions, little research has focused on the limited
nature of attention by empirically assessing the extent to which related actions are dependent on
overall attention within the organization. For example, previous research has empirically
assessed the extent to which executive attention influences a firm’s focus on new technologies
(Eggers & Kaplan, 2009), the attention-based view also supports a broader perspective which
suggests that the attention of organizational members overall will also likely shape firm actions.
Research at both the micro and macro levels has focused on understanding the extent to
which attention and allocation of resources shapes the actions of an organization and its
members. For example, research in the micro literature supports the notion that focusing
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attention on specific goals leads to actions associated with achieving these goals (Locke &
Latham, 2002). In this context, competition and cooperation represent the overarching goal, and
the focus on these actions will likely lead to the enactment of competitive and cooperative
actions. From the macro context, researchers have also supported the power of attention
influencing firm activity. By focusing attention on future-oriented actions, organizations that
identify and focus on new concepts and phenomena are able to overcome the potentially negative
consequences of organizational inertia (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995). Also from the macro
literature on attention, research suggests that continuous focus on both new and existing
heuristics influences the enactment of behaviors in related domains (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006).
Levinthal and Rerup (2006) have also suggested a strong relationship between the focus of
attention and the subsequent enactment of related behaviors. They suggest that organizations
that maintain attentional vigilance—defined as ‘mindfulness’—are likely to engage in more
effective actions than organizations that ignore changing contexts and environments. This
positive relationship between attention and subsequent action is consistent with the original
formulation of the attention-based view (Ocasio, 1997). While the competitive and cooperative
behaviors of the firm represent two independent behaviors that firms can focus attention towards,
this study proposes that attention to competition and cooperation will be positively related to
competitive and cooperative behaviors, respectively. Stated formally:
Hypothesis 1a: Attention to competition is positively related to the enactment of
competitive actions.
Hypothesis 1b: Attention to cooperation is positively related to the enactment of
cooperative actions.
Attention to competitive and cooperative action represents an interdependent
phenomenon and likely falls on a continuum within the firm since these actions draw from the
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same finite attention of the firm. Also, research in the ambidexterity literature suggests
organizational resource constraints present a challenge when seeking to effectively manage
seemingly contradictory behaviors (Jansen, Simsek, & Cao, 2012). By pairing the attentionbased view with ambidexterity, these two theoretical streams support the limiting effects
associated with a finite cognitive resource of the firm such as the attention of members within the
organization. While this study proposes this single continuum perspective for attention, the
actions themselves are proposed to be independent of each other. Considering the nature of
attention and the limited amount of attention firms possess (Ocasio, 1997), this study proposes an
inherent tradeoff associated with devoting attention to the two seemingly paradoxical actions.
For instance, if attention is directed towards cooperative engagements and increasing the
relationships with other organizations, it is likely at the expense of focusing attention on
competitive actions of the firm. For example, Navis & Glynn (2011) analyzed the relationship
between satellite radio providers XM and Sirius as satellite radio gained legitimacy in the
market. Their findings suggested that competition and cooperation occurred sequentially rather
than simultaneously due to the conflicting nature of these two actions within the firm. In early
stages, the relationship was characterized by cooperation, whereas once the market was
established, the competitive actions became the focus of the organizations’ attention. While
attention can be directed at both competition and cooperation, the argument presented in the
attention-based view literature on the finite nature of attention suggests that these behaviors are
at odds in competition for the same attention (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006). As such, this study
proposes a negative relationship between attention to competition and cooperative behaviors, and
a negative relationship between attention to cooperation and competitive actions. By directing
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and focusing attention towards one activity, the firm is using resources at the expense of being
able to direct the resources towards the opposite type of action. Stated formally:
Hypothesis 2a: Attention to competition is negatively related to the enactment of
cooperative actions.
Hypothesis 2b: Attention to cooperation is negatively related to the enactment of
competitive actions.
Actions’ Influence on Performance
From the above discussion, it is proposed that firm actions are indicative of where a
firm’s managers direct their focus and attention (Simon, 1947). As a firm’s attention is directed
at actions such as cooperation, it is likely that the firm will extract value when they focus on
maximizing the returns from interorganizational relationships. By increasing cooperative
actions, it suggests the firm is aware of the need for relationships as a means of developing and
maintaining a competitive advantage (Das & Teng, 1998). While engaging in cooperative
agreements are a means through which organizations can gain access to resources, many
cooperative engagements may result in diminishing returns or even yield negative returns for the
organization (Gulati, Wohlgezogen, & Zhelyazkov, 2012). These diminishing results are a result
of two factors that influence a firm’s ability to capitalize on increased cooperative engagements.
First, within the same cognition literature from which the attention based view originates,
organizational learning literature supports the notion that organizations improve in their ability to
manage more engagements the more they have managed similar situations in the past (Haleblian
& Finkelstein, 1999). Within the learning literature, researchers have found that organizations—
and specifically managers within organizations—are able to leverage prior experiences and
behaviors to improve their ability to capture value associated with cooperative engagements
(Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002). By overcoming this “learning curve,” organizations are able to
more rapidly integrate core resources, manage the processes of cooperation, and create and
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capture value for the firm by improving the firm’s performance (Von Hippel, 1998). Specific to
the context of cooperation, Rindova and Kotha (2001) conducted an in-depth case analysis of
Yahoo! which identified heuristics and organizational learning as a key factor in the firm’s
ability to continuously develop and maintain a competitive advantage through cooperative
engagements. By managing a consistent heuristic for alliance formation, Yahoo! was able to
adapt and manage the dynamic external environment effectively.
While this literature supports the notion that individuals are able to more quickly apply
existing heuristics from previous experience, there is also research that supports the notion of
misappropriation of these heuristics (Bingham, Eisenhardt, & Furr, 2007). Researchers have
identified multiple characteristics of the environment that decrease the effectiveness of previous
experience such as situational similarity, market turbulence, and other externally derived factors
that can have a negative relationship with the effectiveness of heuristics and organizational
learning (Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2007). While research in organizational learning
supports the notion that firms can improve their cooperative performance with experience and
volume, researchers have also found that routinization, excess structure in heuristics, and the lack
of attention towards new engagements may prove to hinder a firm’s ability to continue capturing
value from cooperative engagements (Siggelkow, 2001) .
Second, consistent with the attention-based view of the firm, organizations have a limited
amount of attention that can be directed towards different strategies, actions, and issues of the
firm (Ocasio, 1997). As organizations continue engaging in cooperative engagements with other
firms, individuals within an organization are likely to devote less attention to the new
relationships and apply previously developed heuristics to managing the cooperative
relationships (Miner, Bassof, & Moorman, 2001). While this lack of effort to apply attention to
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the cooperation may hurt the organization, there may be a sheer lack of attention available to
dedicate to the new cooperative engagements in the midst of other cooperative relationships.
While ABV predicts the relationship between attention and actions, it also provides a
framework for understanding how actions mediate the relationship between attention to
competition and cooperation and subsequent firm performance. In essence, the actions of the
firm represent a manifestation of where a firm directs attention, and the performance is a direct
outcome of these tangible and identifiable firm actions. This indirect curvilinear relationship that
assesses attention to cooperation, cooperative actions, and firm performance is well supported by
concepts of organizational learning (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). In the specific context of
cooperation, as a firm increases the number of cooperative actions, it may become too much for
the organization to manage effectively. Also, as firms become complacent in long-term
relationships, firms may not be able to capitalize on these relationships as much as they could
when the firm had more attention to devote to the cooperative engagement (Park et al., 2013).
As such, it is hypothesized:
Hypothesis 3a: Cooperative actions are positively related to firm performance; however, at
a certain point these benefits begin to diminish.
This study also proposes a similar curvilinear relationship between competitive actions
and firm performance. Drawing from the attention based view of the firm and the assumption
that firms are only able to manage and leverage a certain number of competitive actions
effectively without diminishing returns (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006). From an external
perspective, researchers have heavily studied the motivations and outcomes of competitive
behaviors within the competitive dynamics literature (Chen, Kuo-Hsien, & Tsai, 2007; Ferrier,
2001). While this research has identified non-linear relationships with performance as a
possibility due to increased competition, battles for market share, and leveraging multiple attacks
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against competitors (Baum & Korn, 1999), research addressing potential curvilinear effects from
an internal perspective has been limited. Traditionally drawing from the resource based view,
studies examining internal factors often focus on understanding either how resources shape firm
actions, or how resources and resource management influence performance (Sirmon et al., 2011).
Research within this perspective also suggests that organizations need to focus attention on core
competencies and focus on doing a few things great as opposed to a variety of things poorly
(Miller, 1993b; Miller & Chen, 1996). Unique to this study, the attention based view provides a
compelling theoretical framework for understanding both the motivations for enacted behaviors,
and the subsequent relationship with firm performance.
Again referencing the finite nature of attention available to the firm, this study proposes a
curvilinear relationship between competitive behaviors and firm performance due to resource
constraints of the firm and the firm’s ability to effectively manage a large number of competitive
behaviors. On one hand, too few competitive behaviors become routinized and are not given the
necessary attention to be appropriately leveraged, while on the other hand managing too many
competitive behaviors may be detrimental to firm performance as well (Ferrier & Lyon, 2004;
March, 1991). For example, Miller and Chen (1996) analyzed firm competitive action
repertoires and found that the performance implications associated with the simplicity of a firm’s
competitive repertoire might be contingent upon the demands of the environment. In their study
of the airline industry—a dynamic and competitive environment—the results of competitive
action simplicity were mixed. In their externally focused analysis, the effectiveness of
competitive repertoire simplicity was contingent on the nature of the industry. From an internal
perspective, the results may also be a result of misappropriation of attention, or a lack of
available attention to devote to the changing externalities faced by the firm. Members of the
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organization may become overwhelmed and not be able to truly focus attention on the behaviors
to create and sustain the competitive advantage necessary to outperform competitors. Second, by
stretching the firm’s resources with a large number of competitive actions, organizations may
misappropriate attention and sacrifice effectively managing a few competitive behaviors for
poorly executing more competitive actions. This builds directly off of previous literature that
suggest managerial factors are likely to influence the likelihood of a firm’s ability to effectively
leverage a competitive repertoire (Ferrier & Lyon, 2004). By being stretched too thin, the
organization may not be able to reap the benefits of high levels of competitive activity. As such
it is hypothesized:
Hypothesis 3b: Competitive actions are positively related to firm performance; however,
at a certain point these benefits begin to diminish.
While the direct effects between competition and cooperation and subsequent
performance represent meaningful relationships when examined with an attention based view
and ambidexterity, this study also proposes moderation of these relationships based on the same
theoretical frameworks. The previous hypotheses examine the argument that higher levels of
competition and cooperation may be difficult for firms to appropriately and effectively manage.
In essence, the arguments presented suggest that the volume of actions may become too large for
the firm to capture the value associated with the given actions. While previous research has
traditionally examined the volume or variety of behaviors in relation to performance (Wassmer,
2010), this study proposes an integrative model that examines both the number and diversity of
actions as important factors to be addressed when examining the relationship between actions
and performance. This provides a more holistic understanding of how competitive repertoire and
cooperative portfolio volume and variety interactively influence firm performance. Second,
whereas previous research examining these two types of actions has had limited theoretical
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backing, this study proposes these relationships based on the tenets of the attention based view of
the firm.
Research in the cooperation literature has studied both volume and variety to better
understand the nature of the relationship between cooperation and performance. For example,
Deeds and Hill (1996) examine the number of alliances a firm manages and report a curvilinear
relationship between number of relationships and new product development in a high tech sector.
Other studies have also examined the extent to which number of cooperative engagements
influence firm performance; however, most of this research has been in limited contexts with
unique measures of performance like new product development, patents, or other measures of
firm innovation outputs (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). Researchers have also taken a
configurational approach to understand how a certain mix of cooperative engagements may help
or hinder a firm’s performance (Ahuja, 2000; Hoffmann, 2007). While these studies provide
strong insights into the performance implications of cooperation, they fall outside the scope of
the current study. By taking an attention based view approach to understanding how cooperative
diversity influences performance, the focus is more on the internal limitations rather than how a
firm positions itself relative to peers to gain an advantageous position. This study proposes that
in situations characterized by highly diverse cooperative engagements, the deteriorating effects
of alliance portfolio size will be magnified. In essence, when a firm is faced with a large number
of diverse cooperative engagements, the firm will struggle to manage and capitalize on the value
associated with the cooperative engagements of the firm. Firms that actively engage relevant
cooperative partners, and do not overextend themselves into unrelated cooperative engagements
will likely have higher levels of performance due to the value relationships with market-specific
and market-related partners provide the firm (Jiang et al., 2010). Stated formally:
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Hypothesis 4a: The cooperation-performance relationship will be moderated by the
diversity of cooperative actions, such that the relationship will deteriorate with fewer
cooperative actions when the actions are diverse.
Likewise, within the competition literature, researchers have identified volume and
variety as important factors in the relationship between behaviors and performance.
Traditionally, this literature focuses attention on the dynamic nature of competition from an
economic perspective (D'Aveni, Dagnino, & Smith, 2010). For instance, structural determinants
such as industry, market similarity, among a variety of other external factors have been identified
as predictors of competitive behaviors (Chi, Ravichandran, & Andrevski, 2010; Markman,
Gianiodis, & Buchholtz, 2009). A relatively newer stream of research focuses attention on
understanding the cognitive motivations for behavior, and how cognition effects a firm’s ability
to effectively manage and leverage competitive behaviors (Barberis & Thaler, 2003; Marcel,
Barr, & Duhaime, 2011). This growing area of inquiry seeks to shed light on how competitive
moves are determined by features and factors within the firm. Extending this internal
perspective beyond possessing and managing resources, this study contributes by proposing
where a firm focuses attention as a core determinant of a firm’s ability to capture value from
competitive activity. This study not only examines the volume of competitive actions, but also
tests the interactive effects of diversity of competitive actions on the curvilinear relationship
between competitive action and firm performance. At low levels of diversity, firms continue
applying and leveraging the competitive actions that have been commonly leveraged in the past.
At high levels of diversity, firms may struggle to effectively leverage the competitive actions.
This may be a result of misappropriated heuristics and lack of attention to routinized behaviors
without devoting necessary attention to determine the most effective and appropriate types of
actions to enact (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999). In other words, the attention-based view
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suggests that firms with highly diverse competitive repertoires may not be able to devote the
necessary attention to these behaviors to effectively manage and leverage the competitive
behaviors. As such, it is proposed that the original relationship will be magnified at high levels
of competitive behavior diversity. Stated formally:
Hypothesis 4b: The competition-performance relationship will be moderated by the
diversity of competitive actions, such that the relationship will deteriorate with fewer
competitive actions when the actions are diverse.
Finally, the model also proposes a relationship between the balance of competitive and
cooperative behaviors and subsequent firm performance. A key distinction that separates the
final hypothesis from the previous discussion is the concept of balance. While the previous
hypotheses focus attention on understanding how the independent level of competition and
cooperation influence performance, little research has examined the effect the balance of these
two behaviors has on the firm’s performance. In considering cooperative and competitive
actions in tandem, this study draws from the ambidexterity literature (March, 1991).
Research examining organizational ambidexterity provides a view of how potentially
paradoxical behaviors within the firm can be managed and leveraged appropriately to maximize
performance outcomes. Literature examining organizational ambidexterity suggests that
opposing types of behavior provides unique benefits to the organization; however, an
overreliance on one or the other is often detrimental to the organization due to the sacrifice of the
benefits associated with the other (Chen, 2008). Within the existing ambidexterity literature,
research supports the notion that, while these behaviors may seem paradoxical, they both
represent necessary actions for the firm to improve performance and gain a competitive
advantage (Raisch et al., 2009). In cooperation research, the logic of balance has been applied to
corporate expansions. Prior research has shown that a balance between greenfield activity and
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acquisitions leads to longer term success rather than reliance on one type of activity over the
other (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). Prior research in the ambidexterity literature has begun to
shed light onto the appropriate balance for competing organizational actions, although the debate
continues regarding what constitutes balance (Gupta et al., 2006; March, 1991; Raisch &
Birkinshaw, 2008).
In a similar vein to the classic organizational ambidexterity notion of balance between
opposing forces, it is expected that competition and cooperation require balance between the two
sets of actions to positively influence performance (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014; Ketchen et al.,
2004). At the extreme, intense, cut-throat competition within an industry can le ad to rapidly
deteriorating profitability in an industry (Porter, 1980). An overreliance on cooperation may also
lead to deteriorating performance (Park et al., 2013). An organization must find and manage an
appropriate balance of these two seemingly competing interests to maximize firm performance
over time (Raisch et al., 2009).
In the context of the present study, it is proposed that a balance between competition and
cooperation is necessary to maximize firm performance. Competition and cooperation represent
an inherent tradeoff in order to increase one or the other. For example, organizations often
engage in cooperation to acquire or develop new resources and engage in competitive behaviors
to capitalize and reap the benefits of the resources of the firm (Bengtsson, Eriksson, & Wincent,
2010; Tsai, 2002). As a means of understanding how competition and cooperation integratively
impact firm performance, this study predicts that organizations with moderate levels of
competition and cooperation, relative to peers, will have higher levels of firm performance.
Firms that are able to maintain a balance of moderate levels of competition and cooperation will
be able to reap the benefits of both competitive and cooperative actions without overemphasizing
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one or the other. This approach emphasizes the interdependent nature of competitive and
cooperative actions and suggests a need for both types of actions, but also predicts that an
imbalance of these actions will negatively impact performance. Stated formally:
Hypothesis 5: Industry adjusted balance of moderate competition and cooperation will
have a curvilinear relationship with firm performance, such that cooperation or
competition dominated firms will have lower levels of performance.
Conclusion
To summarize, the purpose of the proposed research model seeks to understand the
antecedents and outcomes associated with competitive actions by leveraging the attention based
view of the firm and insights from the ambidexterity literature. The model suggests that
attention to competition and cooperation is manifested in competitive and cooperative actions,
and the firm’s ability to focus attention on these actions will determine the extent to which the
organization effectively captures the value from these actions. By examining direct, indirect, and
curvilinear relationships, the complexity of the model extends knowledge of both the theories
and the phenomena being addressed.
The previous sections provided the overview of the proposed study, a review of the
relevant literatures, and connect theory to the hypotheses within the research model. Having
developed the rationale for the research model and overviewing how this research will fit and
contribute within the existing research, the following section discusses the empirical framework
being leveraged to analyze the research questions of interest. In later sections, the research
outcomes are reported and contributions to the literature will be reviewed along with limitations
and future research opportunities.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY
This chapter provides a detailed description and overview of the measurement and
analytical tools used to empirically test the research model hypothesized in the dissertation.
First, a broad overview of the data, measurements, and tools is presented. Second, a detailed
explanation of the process behind developing and applying content analysis is provided. Third, a
detailed description of the variable measurements is provided. Fourth, a description of the
analytical tests is provided to overview the statistical analyses applied to test the research model.
Finally, the results are reported followed by post hoc analyses and robustness tests of the
research findings.
Overview
In order to test the proposed model, this study uses a longitudinal quantitative approach;
this approach has been leveraged and validated by others in related streams of research (Chen &
Hambrick, 1995; Furrer, Thomas, & Goussevskaia, 2008; Gnyawali & He, 2006). To capture the
necessary elements associated with the model, it is necessary that the sample be drawn from a
context in which competition and cooperation are likely to occur. As such, the sample is drawn
from two industries—the medical devices manufacturing industry (3841) and the oil and gas
field services industry (1381, 1389)—and focuses solely on publicly traded companies.
Measurement of the variables leverages existing metrics for established measures or, for new
variables, follows existing processes of construct development. Attention measures are drawn
from a unique dictionary that was developed, validated, and applied to annual reports (Marcel et
al., 2011), competitive and cooperative actions are measured through news reports (Andrevski,
Brass, & Ferrier, 2013; Rindova et al., 2010), and performance and control variables are drawn
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from Compustat. Finally, the model is analyzed using a two-stage OLS regression model to
assess the hypothesized relationships.
Content Analysis
Content analysis has a strong history of application in the social sciences, and also within
the field of strategic management (Jauch, Osborn, & Martin, 1980; Shapiro & Markoff, 1997).
Content analysis has been applied to data of many forms such as interview transcripts, speeches,
letters to shareholders, newspaper articles, and a variety of other mediums from which words,
themes, and accounts of actions or behaviors can be drawn (Duriau, Reger, & Pfarrer, 2007).
This data collection tool is often used when collecting, coding, and analyzing secondary data
both from and about a focal subject, or in this case a focal firm. When applied to text analysis,
content analysis provides researchers with an opportunity to assess both manifest and latent
variables that are being explicitly or implicitly addressed in the text source (Bettman & Weitz,
1983; Phillips, 1994; Short & Palmer, 2007). For example, text analysis has been applied in the
strategic management field to assess the extent to which firms focus attention on different
technologies, and has also been applied to phenomena such as competitive behaviors and actions
(Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Ferrier et al., 1999). With a well-established history within strategic
management research, content analysis appears to be an appropriate and robust tool for assessing
the constructs and relationships proposed in the research model.
When applying content analysis, it is necessary to identify the unit of analysis associated
with the phenomena of interest. In this case, the proposed study seeks to identify and analyze (1)
attention to competition and cooperation, and (2) the manifestation of this attention in the form
of competitive and cooperative actions. When assessing the attention to competition and
cooperation, the focus is on understanding the implicit attention to competitive and cooperative
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elements. In the present context, it is necessary to develop a dictionary through inductive coding
of documents, and then apply this dictionary to further documents. This approach to dictionary
development and application is common when being applied to new contexts that have yet to be
studied in prior research (Sonpar & Golden-Biddle, 2008). New dictionaries are needed to fit the
idiosyncratic contexts in which the phenomena are studied, given the analysis focuses on
organizational level measures rather than measures at the individual level. Second, while the
attention measures focus on identifying implicit attention to competition and cooperation, the
content analysis of secondary sources associated with competitive behaviors is drawn from
explicit, identifiable behaviors. This type of content analysis of competitive behaviors is
commonly used in the strategic management literature, and will not require development of a
unique dictionary (Ferrier & Lyon, 2004).
By integrating existing measures of established constructs with the development of
dictionaries for new phenomena, this study leverages previous measurements while also
extending the application of content analysis to new areas of inquiry. Using content analysis as a
driving methodology provides rich insights into the attention and behaviors of organizations that
would be difficult to directly ascertain with other methods. By measuring attention and action
through reports of enacted behaviors and the direction of organizational attention and resources,
content analysis mitigates the potential biases associated with survey research and interviews.
As such, it is uniquely applicable to the proposed model that seeks to assess both implicit and
explicit constructs of interest. Having provided a brief overview of content analysis, the
following discussion will elaborate on the sample, measures, and proposed analytical framework
to be applied.

52

Sample
In order to assess the research model, it is important that the sample be drawn from a
context in which competition and cooperation are both present and identifiable behaviors. Also,
considering the measures and nature of content analysis, it is important that the firms within the
sample have the requisite text-based data available. Because publicly traded firms have stronger
reporting requirements (e.g., letters to shareholders, annual reports, performance metrics), and
generate more news volume than non-public firms, publicly traded firms were the focus of this
study. Reports are common sources of data for strategic management researchers leveraging
content analysis methods (Short & Palmer, 2007). Taking these factors into consideration, this
study includes two samples: (1) 15 medical device manufacturing firms and (2) 15 oil and gas
field services firms. These industries were selected based on the prevalence of publicly traded
companies, and the relatively high levels of competition and cooperation within the industries.
Both samples are stratified across the same 10 year window (2002-2013 with one year lags
between predictor and outcome variables). Combined, these two samples provide a total sample
size of 300 firm-year observations.
Measures
In this section, I describe the process of developing and applying the measures of the
focal study. With content analysis, it is common to use existing measures and dictionaries;
however, it is also common to develop dictionaries to assess a specific phenomenon of interest
(Smith et al., 2001). Considering that measures of attention have yet to be developed but other
measures have been developed in prior research, this study applies both existing and developed
dictionaries. The measures are summarized in Table 4.1 and described in more detail below.
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Table 4.1: Summary of Measures
Measures
Previous Literature
Attention to Competition: developed/used dictionary
Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Kaplan,
that references competitive elements within the annual
2008; Kabanoff & Brown, 2008
report. References to relative positioning, competitive
elements, industries, etc. coded as attention to competition
Attention to Cooperation: Developed/used dictionary
that references cooperative engagements and cooperative
language in the annual report

Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Kaplan,
2008; Kabanoff & Brown, 2008

Competitive Actions: Adapted from Ferrier’s dictionary
that identified competitive behaviors via content analysis
of news articles/headlines (7 categories: pricing,
marketing, new product, capacity, legal, signaling,
executive change)

Ferrier, 1999; Ferrier, 2001

Cooperative Actions: Measure of cooperative
Lavie, 2007; Stuart, 2000
relationships, with a 5-year duration, if not specified in the
SDC data
Balance of Competition and Cooperation: Calculated
as the ratio of competitive to cooperative behaviors. Zscores calculated to develop measures for balance relative
to peer firms

Not yet studied in this context

Action Type/Diversity: Herfindahl and Blau indices
calculated as a measure of action diversity. These are
common measures of diversity within competition and
cooperation research, and strategic management, at large.
For cooperation, industry diversity is measured by SIC
code similarity

Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm 1999;
Ferrier, 2001; Jiang, Tao, &
Santoro, 2010

Firm Performance: ROI, ROE, ROA, ROS, market
share growth, and sales growth collected via Compustat
database

Andrevski, Brass, & Ferrier,
2013; Ferrier, 2001; Ndofor,
Sirmon, & He, 2011

Controls: firm size, TMT diversity, slack resources,
performance variation collected via Compustat database

Andrevski, Brass, & Ferrier,
2013; Rindova, Ferrier,
& Wiltbank, 2010; Jiang, Tao, &
Santoro, 2010; Lavie, 2007
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Dependent Variable
According to research in both the competitive and cooperative domains, the prime
objective of both competitive and cooperative behaviors is to achieve a competitive advantage or
improve firm performance (Nag et al., 2007). Independently, competition and cooperation
researchers have suggested positive effects of competitive and cooperative actions in relation to
firm performance (Chen & Miller, 2012; Wassmer, 2010). More recently, coopetition research
that integrates both competition and cooperation has suggested that elements of both competition
and cooperation may have a synergistic relationship and lead to higher levels of firm
performance (Park et al., 2013).
Considering the common empirical examination of firm performance as a dependent
variable of interest, a variety of metrics have been applied to accurately measure the performance
implications of firm behaviors (Combs, Crook, & Shook, 2005). While there is diversity
associated with the measures of firm performance, a common thread that runs through many
studies is the application of financial metrics such as return on assets, return on sales, return on
equity, sales growth, and market share growth (Richard, Devinney, Yip, & Johnson, 2009). In
line with previous research, ROA and ROS are the performance measurements assessed in the
formal hypothesis testing (Derfus et al., 2008; Young, Smith, & Grimm, 1996). Further
measurements are explored and assessed in the post hoc analysis as a robustness test.
Independent Variables
Attention Measures
For the measurement of attention, I developed a new dictionary by pairing existing
qualitative research with a preliminary frequency analysis of keywords in the annual reports of
organizations within the sample (Short, Broberg, Cogliser, & Brigham, 2009). Due to the lack of
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an existing measure to assess the focus of organizational attention on competitive and
cooperative factors, the research project necessitated a rigorous approach to dictionary
development and validation (Short et al., 2009). By developing and applying a dictionary of
attention to competition and cooperation in the annual report, this research is one of the early
studies to operationalize and measure attention at the firm level. Whereas much extant research
uses CEO letters to shareholders as measures of attention, measuring attention at the same level
might suggest a stronger and more accurate depiction of the relationship between attention and
action than was previously identified (Klein, Dansereau, & Hall, 1994).
For the development of the attention to competition and cooperation dictionary, keywords
were initially drawn from prior research. These keywords were developed based on existing
measurements of competitive and cooperative actions alongside existing measures of attention in
letters to shareholders (Ferrier et al., 1999; Marcel et al., 2011). These keywords were the
foundation for measurements that were applied and coded into the dictionary. For example,
references to ‘innovation’ or ‘research and development’ were coded as attention to product
competition. Second, a frequency analysis was conducted on twenty percent of the sample to
identify alternative keywords that would be indicative of attention to competition or cooperation
(Neuendorf, 2002). Whereas the foundational dictionary identified and assessed attention
separate from the competitive and cooperative actions, this coding process provides a holistic
assessment that ties the phenomena of interest (competition and cooperation) to the context of
the sample (annual reports). This measurement of attention and action at the same firm level
allows for linear and curvilinear statistical analysis without the confounding effects associated
with regression tests when measuring variables at different levels.
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After independently developing the dictionary from the existing literature and frequency
analysis, the dictionary was sent to experts in the field with experience in similar research.
Specifically, authors of the foundational work in developing competitive action measurements
and early researchers in the field of assessing attention using qualitative measurement were
contacted. This stage further validates the dictionary by having experts provide their feedback
on which dictionary keywords are likely to be true assessments and measures of the phenomena
of interest (Short et al., 2009). Upon receiving feedback from the expert reviewers, the
dictionary was edited to add and remove keywords identified by the experts based on how well
the dictionary truly measures the constructs of interest.
The dictionary was then sent to three peers for an assessment of interrater reliability.
These peers have knowledge of the existing research project, but were only provided with a
blank dictionary and asked to code specific keywords into the provided categories of interest
within the domains of competition and cooperation. This is the suggested approach laid out by
Krippendorff (2012). The interrater reliability for the attention dictionaries was .79.
Traditionally, researchers suggest .80 is indicative of agreement for existing dictionaries and .70
is indicative of agreement when assessing constructs that are more exploratory in nature—such
as new dictionary development contexts (Krippendorff, 2008). This level of agreement falls
within the threshold of existing research to indicate agreement among coders, especially in the
context of developing a new dictionary. All coding discrepancies were discussed and resolved,
resulting in a finalized dictionary for attention to competition and cooperation dictionary that is
summarized in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: Attention to Competition and Cooperation
Category
Competition

Cooperation

Subcategory
Pricing

Keywords
Deductive—Discount, Price (and variants), Rate, Rebate
Inductive—None added

Example in Context
Competitors may develop superior products of similar
quality at the same or lower prices.

Marketing

Deductive—Advertisement, Ads, Marketing, Promote, Campaign
Inductive—Advertis*, Promot*

To maintain or increase revenues from sales of our
current products, we may be required to adopt new
sales and marketing strategies

Product

Deductive—Innovate, Introduce, Launch, Product, Product
Development, Research and Development, Unveil, Roll out
Inductive—Design, Develop, Exploration, Exploratory, Patents,
Quality, Research, Services, Technology

Our increase in product development costs reflect our
efforts to expand and enhance our product lines

Capacity

Deductive—Capacity, Efficiency, Expansion, Increase output,
Growing
Inductive—Consolidate, Distribution, Equipment, Expanding,
Manufacturing, Production, Restructur*, Volume

Our SAP implementation in July 2006 resulted in
improved efficiencies that lowered COGS

Legal

Deductive—Court, Infringement, Settle, Sue, Litigate
Inductive—Appeal, Audit, Legal, Litigation

We instituted a legal action in Federal Court to
determine the arbitrability of the claims asserted

Signaling

Deductive—Aim, Future, Goal, Objective, Vow, Promise
Inductive—Award*, Brand, Change, Commitment

We are also conducting clinical trials…with the goal of
establishing Impella as the standard of care

Positioning

Deductive—Best, First, Industry, Lead, Leader, Relative,
Position, Top
Inductive—Advantage, Compet*, Gain, Increase, Largest,
Maintain, Market, Peer, Position*, Second, Segment, Standard,
Superior

Our business position depends on our ability to
maintain and defend our existing patents

Keywords

Alliance, Contract, Cooperation, Cooperat*, Joint, Joint Venture,
Partner*, Supplier, Relationship

Bard markets its products through 20 subsidiaries and
a joint venture in over 90 countries outside the US

Inductive
Keywords

Agreement, Association, Conjunction, Distributors,
Intercompany, Partnership, Team, United, Vendors, Negotiate,
Collaboration

We rely on distributors to market and sell our products
in parts of Europe, Asia, South America, and Australia
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Action Measures
While the dictionary applied to the attention measures required extensive development
and firsthand validation, the dictionary and measures associated with competitive and
cooperative actions was applied based on previously validated and applied metrics. Competitive
dynamics research has shifted from a general analysis of organizational characteristics to the
measurement and analysis of tacit competitive actions as the focal unit of analysis. Derived from
work by Ferrier and colleagues (1999), the competition dictionary consisted of six categories for
competitive actions. One additional category was added for executive change due to the existing
research that suggests organizational attention is manifested in the members of the top
management team (Cho & Hambrick, 2006), and changes on this top management team
represent a shift in the phenomena that are being addressed by the organization.
Consistent with the prevailing norms in competitive dynamics research, competitive
action data is collected using the Lexis-Nexis database (Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo, & Hitt, 2010;
Derfus et al., 2008; Ndofor et al., 2011). This database includes headlines from the top global,
national, and regional outlets as well as trade journals that identify and report on industryspecific firm actions. These actions and the categories are listed in Table 4.3. While this
dictionary was previously validated, interrater reliability on coding was also assessed for the
coding of these actions to ensure coding was consistent with the existing literature and between
coders. The interrater reliability for the actions was found to have a Krippendorff’s alpha of .85
among three peers. Discrepancies and issues were again resolved to indicate a strong agreement
among peers regarding competitive and cooperative actions coding.
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Table 4.3: Competition Measures
Variable
Pricing Action

Measure
Count of headlines referencing: price, rate, discount,
rebate, or related material

Example in Context
Patterson-UTI Pumps Big Profit;
Contract Oil Driller Has Jacked Up Its
Day Rates

Marketing Action

Count of headlines referencing: ads, spot, promote,
distribute, campaign, or related material

BD Highlights Social Responsibility in
First Global Corporate Citizenship
Report

Product Action

Count of headlines referencing: introduce, launch,
unveil, roll out, or related material

ABIOMED Announces New Patent for
Heart Wrap Technology

Capacity Action

Count of headlines referencing: raises, boosts, increases,
or related material

Cardinal Health Doubles West Coast
Sterile Manufacturing Capacity to
Support Growing Biotech Industry

Legal Action

Count of headlines referencing: sues, litigate, court,
settles, infringement, or related material

Helmerich and Payne agrees to pay $1
million penalty to resolve allegations of
foreign bribery in South America

Signaling Action

Count of headlines referencing: vows, promises, says,
seeks, aims, or related material

Haemonetics Reaffirms Fiscal 2006 View

Executive Change Action

Count of headlines referencing change in top
management team or board of directors, or related
material

GB announces departure of directors,
certain officers, election of directors,
appointment of certain officers,
compensatory arrangements of certain
officers
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Cooperative actions were assessed based on prevailing measures in the existing literature,
while also being supplemented by further identification of cooperation by examining news
reports of cooperation that are not necessarily identified in formal joint ventures and alliances.
SDC Platinum database captures formal and official cooperative agreements between firms,
specifically joint ventures and alliances (Lavie, 2007; Stuart, 2000). While this captures some of
the firm’s cooperative activity, it fails to capture a holistic measure of a firm’s portfolio of
formal and informal cooperation (Wassmer, 2010). As such, news reports were also analyzed to
supplement the SDC data; these reports are coded as cooperation if they referenced cooperative
activity between a focal firm and another organization or group of organizations. For example,
references to a distribution agreement between two firms is considered a form of cooperation.
Partnerships on research and development projects are also coded as cooperation, among a
variety of other situations where two or more organizations are working together. By
supplementing the SDC Platinum data with the hand coded headlines, a more holistic view of a
firm’s cooperative activity portfolio emerges.
Competitive and Cooperative Action Diversity
Moderators of the relationships between competitive and cooperative actions were
assessed using prevailing measures of diversity of competitive and cooperative action. For
diversity of competitive action, a Herfindahl index was applied to determine the extent to which
an organization focuses on a single type of competitive action or multiple types of competitive
actions (Ferrier & Lyon, 2004; Jiang et al., 2010). A high Herfindahl index is indicative of a
high level of diversity of competitive actions, whereas a low Herfindahl index suggests the firm
relies on a smaller set of actions. While the Herfindahl index is an appropriate measure of
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diversity for continuous variables, when the variable being assessed is categorical the Blau index
is a more appropriate measure of diversity (Blau, 1977).
Following Jiang et al. (2010), cooperative agreements were assessed based on SIC code
overlap at the four digit level. Agreement at the four digit level was scored as 0 for no diversity,
agreement at the three digit level was scored as 1 for partial diversity, agreement at the two digit
level was scored as 2 for moderate diversity, agreement at the one digit level was coded as 3 for
moderate diversity, and zero overlap of SIC code was coded as 4 for high diversity. This coding
of cooperative actions was then aggregated by year and a Blau index of heterogeneity was
calculated to determine the diversity of cooperative engagements.
Balance of Competition and Cooperation
Finally, balance of competition and cooperation is assessed to determine the extent to
which competition and cooperation are synergistically related. Having calculated the total
competitive and cooperative behaviors of the firms, a ratio of competitive to cooperative
behaviors is calculated to determine the balance associated with competition and cooperation of
the firm. Due to the lack of cooperation from a number of firms, the ratio measure would be
undefined. As such, competition and cooperation were measured separately to assess similarity
to the mean of the industry. This was calculated by standardizing the scores of competition and
cooperation and examining the absolute value of the difference score between the z-score and
zero. Firms with a small absolute value term are close to the mean, suggesting a balanced level
of competition or cooperation. To conduct linear analysis on these variables, the scores are
transformed such that higher levels indicate more balanced levels of competition and
cooperation. Finally, to avoid the undefined scores and lack of interpretability associated with
non-linear relationships, the two scores are then run in an interaction model to examine if high
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levels of both competition balance and cooperation balance yield the highest levels of
performance. This allows for the assessment of (1) competition-dominated firms, (2) balanced
firms, and (3) cooperation-dominated firms. By developing and applying this metric of
competition and cooperation balance, it provides an initial measure of a construct that has yet to
be operationalized in previous research. Further conditional analyses are conducted to examine
the performance implications associated with balanced competition and cooperation at high,
medium, and low levels of competition and cooperation.
Control Variables
While some of the potential confounding factors are controlled by the dual industry
sample, within industry factors will still need to be controlled for in the model (Deephouse,
2000). As a result of previously tested relationships and controls in related research, the research
models control for firm specific factors that may influence the hypothesized relationships. The
control variables include firm size, slack resources, performance variation, and varying forms of
top management (TMT) diversity. These measures and the previous findings associated with
these variables are described below.
Available resources are suggested to influence the competitive and cooperative actions of
a firm (Chen & Hambrick, 1995). Two variables that are commonly measured as indicators of
available resources are firm size and the availability of slack resources. At the firm level, size is
measured as the log of total assets, and slack resources is measured as cash-on-hand (Andrevski
et al., 2013; George, 2005). Also at the firm level, an organization’s consistency in performance
may influence the competitive and cooperative actions a firm implements (Ndofor et al., 2011).
Performance variation is measured as the standard deviation of ROA in the previous three years.
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The characteristics and prior experiences of TMT members may have an impact on how
well a firm manages diverse competitive and cooperative engagements (Cho, Hambrick, & Chen,
1994). As such, TMT diversity is measured as: firm tenure, industry experience, age, and
functional background heterogeneity (Rindova et al., 2010). TMT Firm tenure and TMT
industry experience diversity measures are both calculated as a coefficient of variation (standard
deviation divided by the mean) (Ferrier & Lyon, 2004). Due to the categorical nature of
educational and functional background, a Blau index was calculated to determine the diversity of
education and functional domains of TMT members. Finally, TMT Size is also measured and
controlled due to the potential for larger TMTs to have more attention to devote to competition
and cooperation.
Preliminary Data Analysis
In order to analyze the data applying ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, certain
assumptions are necessary to ensure valid inferences are drawn from the statistical tests (Cohen,
Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2013). Before testing the specific research questions, the data was
analyzed for missing data, multicollinearity, normal distribution of errors, linearity, and
homoscedasticity (Lewis-Beck, 1980). All of the data analysis was conducted in STATA and
SPSS software packages.
Missing Data
While the data is drawn from publicly traded companies that have requirements for
reporting on the variables of interest for the specific study, there are still instances where data is
either not available or not reported by the databases. As such, it was necessary to resolve any
missing data instances that would influence and adversely affect the analysis and results. While
there are numerous ways in which to resolve missing data, one of the strongest ways of resolving
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missing data is to apply multiple imputation (Rubin, 1996). This process averages the outcomes
across multiple imputations of the data, and generates new values for missing scores within the
data set. Further, due to the panel nature of the data set it was necessary to conduct the multiple
imputation process on each individual firm to ensure a valid within subject score is calculated
and applied. Within the overall sample, data were only missing in control variables or
components of performance measures such as ROI and ROE: cash, stockholder’s equity, and
invested capital. Within these variables, none had more than 5% missing on any individual
variable, and as such, multiple imputation is an appropriate method of resolving missing data
issues (Schafer, 1999). Upon completing the multiple imputation process, I then tested for
independence of the variables.
Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity, or the high linear correlation of two predictor variables, represents a
significant confounding effect in regression (Farrar & Glauber, 1967). In order to test for the
possibility of multicollinearity, I calculated and analyzed the variance inflation factors (VIFs) to
further explore whether or not multicollinearity was present. A general rule of thumb suggests
that any of the independent variables with a VIF over 10 represents the presence of
multicollinearity (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & William, 1998). The average VIF among
independent variables was 4.4, well below the threshold outlined in current research. Also,
curvilinear terms were not included in the test for multicollinearity due to the fact that the scores
are calculated based on the linear independent variables.
Normal Distribution of Errors
Another assumption and condition of OLS regression is the requirement that the errors
associated with the fitted model are normally distributed. Upon running the linear test between
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the independent variables and the dependent variable, the error terms were identified and
analyzed by creating a normality plot. A linear term is generated, and the scores for the specific
variables of interest are plotting along the line. The results showed a strong fit between the
actual data and the linear prediction, which strongly suggests that the error terms are normally
distributed.
Linearity
While the research model tests linear and curvilinear hypotheses, the linear relationships
in the model were tested for the nature of the relationship independently of the quadratic terms.
After running the linear relationships, a residual-versus-fitted (RVF) plot was generated and
analyzed that assess the relationship between the residual error terms and the fitted prediction
terms of the model. The plot showed no signs of non-linear relationships and suggested that the
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable is indeed linear
(Cohen et al., 2013).
Homoscedasticity
In order to test for homoscedasticity, it is necessary to examine the distribution of
variance across the range of values of the independent variable. Similar to the above tests, the
linear regression model was calculated and postestimation tests provided the statistical
assessment of the homoscedasticity of the data. For each regression model, a Cook-Weisberg
test for heteroscedasticity was calculated, and each model met the assumption of
homoscedasticity (Cohen et al., 2013). Having found no significant results that reject the null
hypothesis of normal variance across the range of values for the independent variable, the
research models suggest that the distribution of variance across values of the models are
homoscedastic. Finally, to further control for potential confounding influence of
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heteroscedasticity, the statistical analyses were run with robust standard errors to mitigate
heteroscedasticity effects.
Conclusion
Having thoroughly tested and ensured the assumptions associated with OLS regression
have been met, the following analyses appear appropriate and valid for testing the hypothesized
relationships. By rigorously testing the data in pre- and post-estimation contexts, the OLS results
associated with the regression tests are appropriate and accurate depictions of the relationships
present in the dataset. In the following section, I will describe the analysis framework and the
results associated with the statistical tests.
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
This section provides a thorough description of the analyses applied to test the
hypothesized relationships. First, it provides an overview and summary of the analysis
framework for the study. Second, the results associated with the specific hypothesis testing
proposed in the research model are discussed. Third, a summary of the research findings
followed by a discussion of the limitations is presented. Finally, it concludes with a thorough
explanation of a variety of post hoc analyses that were tested to further explore the relationships
among constructs in the research model.
Analysis
Considering the structure of the research model and the panel nature of the data, OLS
regression provides the strongest statistical test for the research model. While the structural
model appears to be appropriate for structural equation modeling (SEM), controlling for the
within and between firm-year factors is not as robust as when tested with OLS regression
(Wooldridge, 2010). Further, OLS regression allows for controlling firm specific factors as well
as year specific factors that may confound the results. Finally, the model being tested implies an
inherent two stage method of analysis—the first stage of analysis assesses the relationships
between attention to competition and cooperation and the enactment of competitive and
cooperative actions, while the second stage of analysis assesses the relationships between
competitive and cooperative actions and subsequent firm performance.
Another note about the panel nature of the data and subsequent analysis is how the time is
controlled for and analyzed in the statistical tests. Having drawn the sample from 30 firms
across 10 years, the initial sample yielded a staggered sample of 300 firm-year observations. It is
staggered such that the lagging of variables matches up based on the hypothesized relationships.
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For example, the attention variables were collected from 2002-2011, the action variables were
collected from 2003-2012, and the performance measurements were collected from 2004-2013.
This allows for the analysis to be conducted on the full 300 firm-year observations with the
hypothesized lag of time to (1) allow for the attention to be directed towards the actions, and (2)
for the performance of the organization to be influenced by the enacted competitive and
cooperative actions.
Finally, in regards to time, the analysis is not conducted applying time-series regression
due to the fact that the variables of interest are not inherently time-oriented. In other words, time
is not the predictor of the changes of the dependent variable, but rather the changes and variation
of the independent variables are what determine the variation of the dependent variable. The
only time effects of interest, in the present study, are in reference to the independent variables
having delayed effects on the dependent variable. While time is not the focus of the study, year
effects are controlled for to mitigate the effects associated with a specific year on the sample.
Firm effects are also controlled for to minimize the potentially confounding effects of factors
within the organization’s scope.
Regression Results
Considering the two-stage nature of the research model, the results will be discussed in
two sections. The first model will be discussed referencing the relationships between the
attention devoted to competition and cooperation and the enactment of competitive and
cooperative actions. The second model will then be discussed that addresses the relationships
between the enactment of competitive and cooperative actions and the subsequent influence on
firm performance. A further, in-depth discussion of the results will follow in the Discussion. A
general overview of the descriptive statistics and correlations is provided in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations
Mean

S.D.

ROA

ROS

Com
p Act

Coop
Act

Com
p Div

Coop
Div

Com
p Att

Coop
Att

ROA

.06

.098

1

ROS

-1.27

16.40

0.12

1

28.82

30.83

0.1

0.01

1

2.62

3.91

0.21

0.02

0.5

1

.31

.19

0.12

0

0.26

0.05

1

.18

.25

0.12

-0.08

0.52

0.68

0.07

1

.04

.01

0.01

0.08

0.21

0.32

-0.17

0.34

1

-0.31

-0.05

-0.07

-0.11

-0.04

-0.02

1

0.37

-0.17

0.32

0.18

0.15

Comp
Act
Coop
Act
Comp
Div
Coop
Div
Comp
Att
Coop
Att
Size
(log)
Slack

.01

.01

-0.11

7.04

1.93

0.24

-0.03

0.43

Size
(log)

Slack

Perf
Var

TMT
Func

TMT
Age

TMT
Tenu
re

TMT
Size

1

356.54 604.87
0.14
0.01
0.47 0.46 -0.21
0.45
0.13
0.14
0.63
1
Perf
Var
.05
.08 -0.37
0.01
-0.09 -0.07
0.03 -0.08 -0.08
0.03
-0.33
-0.13
1
TMT
Func
.70
.09 -0.03
0.23
-0.01 0.01
-0.1
0
0.27
0.08
0.05
-0.15 -0.02
TMT
Age
.12
.12 -0.14
0.15
-0.21 -0.23
0.23 -0.24
0
-0.04
-0.38
-0.3 0.14
TMT
Tenure
.69
.36 -0.32
0.05
-0.09
-0.1
-0.1 -0.07
0.03
0.1
0.03
0.04 0.01
TMT
Size
5.21
1.15 -0.02
0.16
0.14 0.13 -0.22
0.14
0.23
0.13
0.24
0.14
-0.1
Note: n=286, correlations above .12 are significant at the p<.05 level, correlations above .16 are significant at the p<.01 level.
are controlled, but not reported due to length.

1
0.07

1

0.05

0.08

1

0.45
-0.07
0.33
1
Firm, Year, and Industry effects

70

Attention to Action
When assessing the extent to which organizational attention influences competitive and
cooperative action external factors must also be included in the model because they can influence
the nature of the relationships being tested. Considering the relatively new nature of examining
the relationship between attention and action at the organizational level, the controls applied to
the current model were drawn from the limited amount of existing empirical work regarding the
topic. The presence of previously tested variables within the model, the theoretically defined
lagged effects of the independent variables, and the controls for industry, firm, and year effects
suggest a robust model of analysis.
Table 5.2: Competitive and Cooperative Attention leading to Subsequent
Competitive Actions
Model 1
Model 2
Independent
Variables:
Competitive Attention
2.83
Cooperative Attention
-3.01
Controls:
Size
Slack
Performance Variation
TMT Function
TMT Age
TMT Tenure
TMT Size

1.18
15.05**
.98
-5.60**
2.85†
.68
-1.42

3.75
15.60**
1.22
-6.69**
3.01†
.68
-.70

R2
.69**
.70**
F-Statistic
F=1.61
Notes: n=286. Reported betas are standardized. ** significance at the .01 level;
* significance at the .05 level; † significance at the .10 level. Firm, Year, and
Industry effects are controlled, but not reported due to length.

Tables 5.2 and 5.3 report the results for Hypotheses 1 and 2. In Hypotheses 1a, a positive
relationship is predicted between prior competitive attention and current competitive action.
This hypothesis was not supported (β=2.83, p=.21). Similarly, Hypothesis 1b predicted a
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positive relationship between prior cooperative attention and current cooperative action. This
hypothesis was strongly supported (β=.63, p<.01). In Hypothesis 2a, a negative relationship
between prior competitive attention and current cooperative action was proposed based on the
situated nature of attention within the organization. This hypothesis was not supported. Finally,
Hypothesis 2b proposed a negative relationship between prior cooperative attention and current
competitive action. While the relationship was in the direction hypothesized (β=-3.01, p=.15),
the effect is not significant failing to support Hypothesis 2b.
Table 5.3: Competitive and Cooperative Attention leading to
Subsequent Cooperative Actions
Model 1
Model 2
Independent
Variables:
Competitive
.11
Attention
Cooperative
.63**
Attention
Controls:
Size
Slack
Performance
Variation
TMT Function
TMT Age
TMT Tenure
TMT Size

-.1.87**
-.32

-2.24**
-.40

-.28

-.36

.71**
-.32†
.00
-.45*

.57**
-.25
.04
-.41*

R2
.81**
.83**
F-Statistic
F=9.38**
Notes: n=286. Reported betas are standardized. ** significance at the .01
level; * significance at the .05 level; † significance at the .10 level. Firm,
Year, and Industry effects are controlled, but not reported due to length.

Action to Performance
Hypotheses 3a and 3b predict that the relationships between prior competition (3a) and
cooperation (3b) and current firm performance are positive, but experience diminishing returns at
higher levels of activity. In testing Hypothesis 3a which suggests this deteriorating effect of
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competitive action on firm performance is not supported in relationship to ROA or ROS. In fact,
the relationship between competitive activity and firm performance is found to have a significant
curvilinear relationship between competitive action and ROS in the opposite direction than
hypothesized, as indicated by the significant negative linear relationship (β=-15, p<.05) and
positive quadratic term (β=.17, p<.05). This relationship is shown in Figure 5.1. Hypothesis 3b
predicts the same diminishing returns relationship between cooperative actions and firm
performance. This relationship is supported in relation to ROA, with a positive linear
relationship (β=.07, p<.01) and negative quadratic term (β=-.04, p<.05); however, the
relationship is not supported in relation to ROS. This significant curvilinear effect is shown in
Figure 5.2. These results are reported below in Tables 5.4 (ROA dependent variable) and 5.5
(ROS dependent variable).
Hypotheses 4a and 4b propose moderation of the curvilinear relationships between prior
competitive and cooperative actions and current firm performance. These hypotheses suggest
that as the diversity of competitive and cooperative action increases, the diminishing returns will
occur at lower levels of competitive and cooperative actions—magnifying the deteriorating
effects on firm performance. Hypothesis 4a, referencing the diversity of cooperative actions, is
supported in Model 5 with a significant interaction term for the linear (β=-.04, p<.05) and
curvilinear effects (β=.04, p<.05). As seen in the interaction plot, higher cooperative diversity is
better in low cooperative activity; however, at high levels of cooperative activity, the low
cooperative diversity has higher levels of performance. This significant interaction can be seen
in Figure 5.3. From Hypothesis 4b, the moderation of the existing curvilinear relationship
between competitive action and firm performance was not found be significant.
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Balance of Competitive and Cooperative Action in Relation to Performance
The final hypothesis proposes that a balance of competitive and cooperative actions,
relative to peers, will lead to higher levels of firm performance. For example, organizations that
do not have too few or too many actions will have an optimal level of actions to yield higher
performance. The results of the balance model are shown in Table 5.6 below. Model 2 tests the
direct effects of competitive and cooperative balance independently, and Model 3 tests the
interaction of competition and cooperation. Based on the lack of significance for the direct or
interaction terms, Hypothesis 5 is not supported in the model. This relationship is further
explored in the post hoc analyses to follow.
Conclusion
The research model proposed testing a variety of direct, indirect, and non-linear
relationships that have yet to be fully explored in the extant research. In terms of support, only
three of the nine hypotheses are supported. Within the attention model, the only statistically
significant relationship identified is the positive relationship between attention to cooperation
and cooperative action. Within the action to performance model, the relationship between
cooperative action and firm performance was significant and curvilinear in the direction
hypothesized. In contrast, the curvilinear relationship between competitive action and firm
performance was actually found to be significant in the opposite direction of the hypothesis. The
moderating effect of cooperative diversity on the relationship between cooperative actions and
performance is also significant. Several relationships are further explored in the following post
hoc analyses.
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Table 5.4: Competitive and Cooperative Action to Subsequent Performance (ROA)

Model 1 (Controls)
Independent Variables:
Competitive Action
Competitive Action
Squared
Cooperative Action
Cooperative Action
Squared

Model 2 (Direct Linear
Effects)

Model 3 (Direct Linear
and Curvilinear)

Model 4 (Linear,
Curvilinear, Moderators)

.00

-.01

-.01

-.01

.00

.00

.00

.07**

.07**

.02**

-.04*

Moderators:
Competitive Diversity
Cooperative Diversity

-.04

†

.00
.00

Interactions:
Competitive Action x
Competitive Diversity
Competitive Action
Squared x Competitive
Diversity
Cooperative Action x
Cooperative Diversity
Cooperative Action
Squared x Cooperative
Diversity
Controls:
Size
Slack
Performance Variation
TMT Function
TMT Age
TMT Tenure
TMT Size

Model 5 (Linear
Curvilinear,
Moderators,
Interactions)

.07**
-.05*

.00
.00

.00
.00
-.04*
.04*

-.04*
.02†
-.03**
.00
.01
-.01†
.00

-.03
.02*
-.02*
.00
.01
-.01†
.01

-.03
.02*
-.02*
.00
.01†
-.01†
.01

-.03
.02*
-.02*
.00
.01†
-.01†
.01

-.03†
.02*
-.03*
.01
.01†
-.01
.01

R2
.59**
.61**
.62**
.62**
.63**
F-Test
F=4.85**
F=3.23*
F=.36
F=2.56†
Notes: n=278. Reported betas are standardized. ** significance at the .01 level; * significance at the .05 level; † significance at the .10 level. Firm, Year, and Industry
effects are controlled, but not reported due to length.
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Table 5.5: Competitive and Cooperative Action to Subsequent Performance (ROS)

Model 1 (Controls)
Independent Variables:
Competitive Action
Competitive Action Squared
Cooperative Action
Cooperative Action Squared

Model 2 (Direct Linear
Effects)
-.02
.01

Model 3 (Direct
Linear and
Curvilinear)
-.15*
.17*
.02
-.01

Moderators:
Competitive Diversity
Cooperative Diversity

Model 4 (Linear,
Curvilinear,
Moderators)

Model 5 (Linear
Curvilinear,
Moderators,
Interactions)

-.15*
.17*
-.02
.02

-.14*
.14
-.01
-.01

.00
.02

-.01
.03

Interactions:
Competitive Action x
Competitive Diversity
Competitive Action Squared x
Competitive Diversity
Cooperative Action x
Cooperative Diversity
Cooperative Action Squared x
Cooperative Diversity
Controls:
Size
Slack
Performance Variation
TMT Function
TMT Age
TMT Tenure
TMT Size

-.06
.11
-.05
.06

-.17**
.02
-.04
.00
.00
.00
.01

-.15*
.01
-.04
-.01
.00
.00
.01

-.12†
.02
-.04
-.01
.00
-.01
.01

-.13†
.02
-.04
-.01
.00
.00
.01

R2
.71**
.71**
.72**
.72**
F-Stat for change in R2
F=.45
F=2.63†
F=.76
Notes: n=276. Reported betas are standardized. ** significance at the .01 level; * significance at the .05 level; † significance at the .10 level.
Firm, Year, and Industry effects are controlled, but not reported due to length.

-.12†
.02
-.05†
-.01
.00
.00
.01
.72**
F=.85
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Figure 5.1: Competitive Action to ROS
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Figure 5.2: Cooperative Action to ROA
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Figure 5.3: Cooperative Diversity Moderating
Cooperative Action to ROA, Full Sample
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Table 5.6: Competitive and Cooperative Balance Interaction to Subsequent Performance (ROA)
Model 1 (Controls)

Model 2 (Direct
Linear Effects)

Model 3 (Direct
Linear and
Interaction)

Independent Variables:
Competitive Balance
Cooperative Balance

.01
-.03

Interaction:
Competitive x Cooperative
Balance

-.15
-.26

.25

Controls:
Size
Slack
Performance Variation

-.04**
.02*

-.04*
.02*

-.04*
.02**

-.03***

-.02**

-.02**

TMT Function
TMT Age
TMT Tenure
TMT Size

.00
.01
-.01*
.00

.00
.01
-.01*
.01

.00
.01
-.01*
.00

R2
.59***
.59***
.60***
F-Test
F=.49
F=.97
Notes: n=286. Reported betas are standardized. ** significance at the .01 level; * significance at the .05 level;
† significance at the .10 level. Firm, Year, and Industry effects are controlled, but not reported due to length.

Post Hoc Analyses
The proposed relationships and hypotheses in the research model focus on understanding
(1) if attention to competition and cooperation influence the enactment of competitive and
cooperative action and (2) if these competitive and cooperative actions shape performance.
Inherent in the model and proposed analyses is a focus on time—for instance, when are the
outcome variables influenced by the attention and actions of the independent variables? As
tested in the formal hypotheses, the effects are lagged one year to allow for the firm to
implement the actions referenced in the annual reports (attention), and also to allow for the value
to be captured and the market to react to the competitive and cooperative actions of the firm. As
tested, the varying effects on different performance variables provides potentially interesting
implications for what actions influence different measures of firm performance. Beyond ROA
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and ROS which were used as performance measures for hypothesis testing, other measures of
performance were analyzed to assess the impact of competitive and cooperative action. Also, the
results were tested in separate industry samples to assess the extent to which the results vary
within the different industry contexts. Finally, the hypothesis regarding balance of competitive
and cooperative actions is further explored leveraging ANOVA to determine where group
differences exist in regards to firm performance.
The longitudinal analysis of the panel data was conducted such that the reactions to the
independent variables would be manifested in subsequent years. For example, attention in prior
years (t-1) would influence the current year’s actions (t), and current actions would not lead to
higher levels of performance until the firm captures the value associated with the market’s
reaction to the competitive and cooperative actions in subsequent years (t+1). As a post hoc
analysis, the same models tested in the formal hypotheses were examined as cross-sectional data
without the lag of the independent variables. This was conducted to assess the extent to which
organizational attention and actions occur simultaneously, rather than with delayed effects that
were tested in the lagged models.
For the attention leading to action, the analysis suggests that organizational attention
influences actions in the present, as well. As indicated in Tables 5.7 and 5.8, the relationship
between competitive attention and competitive action becomes marginally significant (β=4.28,
p<.10). In addition, the magnitude of the relationship between cooperative attention and
competitive action is negative (β=-2.14), but not significant. Second, the positive relationship
between cooperative attention and cooperative action remains significant when tested without
lagged independent variables (β=.40, p<.05). The effect of competitive attention on cooperative
action, however, remains insignificant.

80

Table 5.7: Competitive and Cooperative Attention leading to
Competitive Actions
Model 3 (non-lagged IVs)
Independent Variables:
Competitive Attention
Cooperative Attention
Controls:
Size
Slack
Performance Variation
TMT Function
TMT Age
TMT Tenure
TMT Size

Model 4 (non-lagged IVs)
4.28†
-2.14

1.18
15.05**
.98
-5.60**
2.85†
.68
-1.42

.71
15.93**
1.18
-6.08**
2.63
.80
-1.47

R2
.69**
.70**
F-Statistic
F=3.56†
Notes: n=286. Reported betas are standardized
** significance at the .01 level; * significance at the .05 level; † significance at the
.10 level
Firm, Year, and Industry effects are controlled, but not reported due to length

Table 5.8: Competitive and Cooperative Attention leading to
Cooperative Actions
Model 3 (non-lagged IVs)
Independent
Variables:
Competitive Attention
Cooperative Attention
Controls:
Size
Slack
Performance
Variation
TMT Function
TMT Age
TMT Tenure
TMT Size

Model 4 (non-lagged IVs)

.10
.40*

-.1.87**
-.32

-1.95**
-.30

-.28

-.28

.71**
-.32†
.00
-.45*

.695**
-.24
-.08
-.41*

R2
.81**
.82**
F-Statistic
F=3.85*
Notes: n=286. Reported betas are standardized
** significance at the .01 level; * significance at the .05 level; † significance at
the .10 level
Firm, Year, and Industry effects are controlled, but not reported due to length
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A similar cross-sectional analysis was conducted on the relationship between competitive
and cooperative actions and firm performance. The same tests were run as in previous models;
however, the measures of competitive and cooperative actions were drawn from the same year as
the firm’s performance. This analysis was conducted to examine the extent to which actions in
the present have an immediate influence on firm performance. As indicated in Table 5.9, the
relationship between competitive and cooperative actions and ROA are similar to the results
found in the lagged models. The results indicate similar findings with cooperative action having
a significant linear relationship with ROA (β=.02, p<.05), but the curvilinear effect is not found
to be significant. These relationships, however, are significant in the final full model. Similar to
the earlier results, the relationship between competitive action and ROA was found to be
insignificant. Consistent with the earlier analysis of both measures of performance, the tests
were regressed on ROS, as well. The direct effects remain insignificant; however, the indirect
effects present in model 5 represent significant differences at high and low levels of competitive
diversity. These results are presented in Table 5.10. While these effects are significant, the
model does not significantly improve the fit of the estimated model. As such, the differences are
only reported for descriptive purposes. The moderation can be seen in Figure 5.4.
While measures such as ROA and ROS are holistic measures of firm performance
(Richard et al., 2009), some scholars in related research streams focus attention on a more
market-based approach to assess measures such as sales or market growth (Ferrier et al., 1999).
As such post hoc analyses assessed the same relationships as hypothesized in the model, but
measuring performance as sales growth and market share growth.
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Figure 5.4: Competitive Diversity Moderating
Competitive Action to ROS, Non-Lagged

The first alternative measure of firm performance that was examined was the relationship
between firm actions and sales growth. Measuring sales growth assesses performance from a
market-based approach, rather than a returns-based approach when measured as ROA or ROS.
The measure of sales growth controls for size by calculating percentage growth as opposed to
simply measuring aggregate growth. Considering the inherent lag in calculating sales growth as
a difference score, the independent variables in the models are not lagged. When examining the
same relationships as analyzed before, none of the relationships indicate a significant
relationship between competitive and cooperative actions and sales growth.
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Table 5.9: Non-Lagged Competitive and Cooperative Action to Performance (ROA)
Model 1 (Controls)
Independent Variables:
Competitive Action
Competitive Action Squared
Cooperative Action
Cooperative Action Squared

Model 2 (Direct Linear
Effects)
.00
.02*

Model 3 (Direct Linear
and Curvilinear)
-.02
.01
.05*
-.02

Moderators:
Competitive Diversity
Cooperative Diversity

Model 4 (Linear,
Curvilinear,
Moderators)
-.02
.01
.06*
-.03†

-.01
.00
.07*
-.04*

-.01
-.01

-.01
.00

Interactions:
Competitive Action x
Competitive Diversity
Competitive Action Squared
x Competitive Diversity
Cooperative Action x
Cooperative Diversity
Cooperative Action Squared
x Cooperative Diversity
Controls:
Size
Slack
Performance Variation
TMT Function
TMT Age
TMT Tenure
TMT Size

Model 5 (Linear
Curvilinear, Moderators,
Interactions)

-.01
.02
-.03
.03

.00
.00
-.01
.00
.00
-.02*
.00

.02
.00
-.01
.00
.00
-.02**
.01

.02
.00
.00
.00
.00
-.02**
.01

.02
.01
.00
.00
.00
-.02**
.01

R2
.60**
.61**
.61**
.62**
F-Test
F=3.39*
F=1.48
F=1.47
Notes: n=276. Reported betas are standardized. ** significance at the .01 level; * significance at the .05 level; † significance at the .10 level.
Firm, Year, and Industry effects are controlled, but not reported due to length.

.02
.01
-.01
.00
.00
-.02**
.00
.62**
F=1.50
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Table 5.10: Non-Lagged Competitive and Cooperative Action to Performance (ROS)
Model 1 (Controls)
Independent Variables:
Competitive Action
Competitive Action Squared
Cooperative Action
Cooperative Action Squared

Model 2 (Direct Linear
Effects)
.00
.00

Model 3 (Direct Linear
and Curvilinear)
-.01
.01
.02
-.02

Moderators:
Competitive Diversity
Cooperative Diversity

Model 4 (Linear,
Curvilinear,
Moderators)
-.02
.03
.03
-.02

.01
-.04
.04
-.04

-.03**
-.01

-.05**
.00

Interactions:
Competitive Action x
Competitive Diversity
Competitive Action Squared
x Competitive Diversity
Cooperative Action x
Cooperative Diversity
Cooperative Action Squared
x Cooperative Diversity
Controls:
Size
Slack
Performance Variation
TMT Function
TMT Age
TMT Tenure
TMT Size

Model 5 (Linear
Curvilinear, Moderators,
Interactions)

-.09*
.14*
-.02
.03

-.09†
.02
-.07**
-.01
.01
-.01
.01

-.09†
.02
-.07**
-.01
.01
-.01
.01

-.09
.02
-.07**
-.01
.01
-.01
.01

-.08
.02
-.07**
-.02
.01
-.01
.00

-.07
.02
-.07**
-.01
.01
-.01
.00

R2
.76**
.76**
.76**
.77**
.77**
F-Test
F=.01
F=.18
F=3.53*
F=2.07
Notes: n=276. Reported betas are standardized. ** significance at the .01 level; * significance at the .05 level; † significance at the .10 level. Firm, Year, and
Industry effects are controlled, but not reported due to length.
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Another performance measure that was examined is market share growth. Considering
the focus of the present study directs attention at the competitive actions of the organization, it is
important to determine if the enactment of these competitive and cooperative actions influences
an organization’s performance relative to competitors. As such, market share growth provides a
test of how competitive and cooperative actions alter the competitive landscape of a specific
industry based on firm behaviors. The models again do not lag the independent variables due to
the inherent effects of time in the calculation of the dependent variable as a measure of growth
year over year. In the analysis of these relationships, none of the relationships between the
independent actions of the organization and firm performance were found to be significant. The
results associated with market share growth are to be interpreted with caution, however. Due to
the diversified nature of organizations in both of the industries within the sample, some
organizations engage in competitive and cooperative actions focused on growing markets beyond
the scope of the sample industry. For example, an organization that manufactures medical
devices may direct competitive and cooperative actions at increasing market share in a secondary
market like the medical services industry. In other words, the actions that organizations enact
may not be directly linked to the growth within the specific market that is calculated within the
sample.
To further examine the results in the proposed research model, I conducted an
independent analysis of each industry. As such, I tested the hypothesized lagged models that
assess the relationships proposed in the research model. The analyses were conducted on the
holistic measures of performance, ROA and ROS. Significant results will be further discussed
below.
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In terms of the medical devices industry, the results are largely consistent with the overall
results presented in the combined sample. These relationships are reported in Tables 5.11 and
5.12. The curvilinear relationships between cooperative action and firm performance is again
found to be significantly related to ROA (linear β=.10, p<.01, quadratic β=-.06, p<.01). While
the curvilinear relationship in the overall model was not significant in relation to ROS, the
medical devices subsample has a significant curvilinear relationship with ROS (linear β=.12,
p<.01, quadratic β=-.08, p<.05). The moderating effect of competitive action diversity was again
found to be nonsignificant. In the cooperative diversity moderation, however, the significant
moderating effects are consistent across both ROA and ROS. These results are consistent with
the results presented in the full estimated model. Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show these moderating
effects.
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Figure 5.5: Cooperative Diversity Moderating
Cooperative Action to ROA, Medical Devices
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Table 5.11: Lagged Competitive and Cooperative Action to Performance (ROA), Medical Devices
Model 1 (Controls)
Independent Variables:
Competitive Action
Competitive Action Squared
Cooperative Action
Cooperative Action Squared

Model 2 (Direct Linear
Effects)
-.01
.02†

Model 3 (Direct Linear
and Curvilinear)
-.02
.01
.10**
-.06**

Moderators:
Competitive Diversity
Cooperative Diversity

Model 4 (Linear,
Curvilinear,
Moderators)
-.03
.01
.11**
-.07**

.01
-.01

Interactions:
Competitive Action x
Competitive Diversity
Competitive Action Squared x
Competitive Diversity
Cooperative Action x
Cooperative Diversity
Cooperative Action Squared x
Cooperative Diversity
Controls:
Size
Slack
Performance Variation
TMT Function
TMT Age
TMT Tenure
TMT Size

Model 5 (Linear
Curvilinear, Moderators,
Interactions)
-.05†
.03
.12**
-.08**

.01
.01

.02
-.02
-.09**
.06**

-.02
-.01
-.03*
.02
.02
-.02
.00

-.01
.00
-.03†
.01
.02†
-.02
-.01

.00
-.01
-.03*
.01
.02
-.02
.00

.01
-.01
-.03*
.00
.02
-.02
.00

.01
.02
-.02†
.00
.02
-.01
.00

R2
.66**
.68**
.71**
.72**
.76**
F-Test
F=2.4†
F=6.88**
F=.75
F=5.14**
Notes: n=137. Reported betas are standardized. ** significance at the .01 level; * significance at the .05 level; † significance at the .10 level. Firm, Year, and Industry
effects are controlled, but not reported due to length.
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Table 5.12: Lagged Competitive and Cooperative Action to Performance (ROS), Medical Devices
Model 1 (Controls)
Independent Variables:
Competitive Action
Competitive Action Squared
Cooperative Action
Cooperative Action Squared

Model 2 (Direct Linear
Effects)
-.01
.03

Model 3 (Direct Linear
and Curvilinear)
-.09
.10
.12**
-.08*

Moderators:
Competitive Diversity
Cooperative Diversity

Model 4 (Linear,
Curvilinear,
Moderators)
-.09
.10
.16**
-.10**

.01
-.02

Interactions:
Competitive Action x
Competitive Diversity
Competitive Action Squared x
Competitive Diversity
Cooperative Action x
Cooperative Diversity
Cooperative Action Squared x
Cooperative Diversity
Controls:
Size
Slack
Performance Variation
TMT Function
TMT Age
TMT Tenure
TMT Size

Model 5 (Linear
Curvilinear, Moderators,
Interactions)
-.07
.04
.20**
-.12**

.02
.01

-.09
.14
-.16**
.11**

-.11†
-.01
-.03
.01
.02
-.03
-.01

-.09
.00
-.02
.01
.02
-.03
.00

-.07
-.01
-.03
-.01
.01
-.04
.00

-.06
-.01
-.03
-.01
.00
-.04
.00

-.04
-.01
-.02
-.01
.01
-.03
.00

R2
.65**
.66**
.69**
.69**
.74**
F-Test
F=1.24
F=4.87**
F=.66
F=5.32**
Notes: n=132. Reported betas are standardized. ** significance at the .01 level; * significance at the .05 level; † significance at the .10 level. Firm, Year, and Industry
effects are controlled, but not reported due to length.
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Figure 5.6: Cooperative Diversity Moderating
Cooperative Action to ROS, Medical Devices

There are a few differences in the results when the analysis is run independently on the
oil and gas field services subsample. First, when the model is analyzed with ROA as the firm
performance measure, none of the relationships are significant. While the relationships are not
significant, the directionality of the relationships between competition and cooperation and firm
performance are largely consistent with the results found in the full sample. The previously
significant relationships in the full model for cooperative action is not found to be supported in
this model. The oil and gas field services results are reported in Tables 5.13 and 5.14.
The most notable difference in the oil and gas field services subsample is the presence of
interactions in the ROS model. Model 5, which includes all of the direct and indirect effects,
provides a significantly better fit when compared to the previous model with only the direct
effects (F=4.83, p<.01). In both competitive and cooperative diversity, the results suggest
90

significant moderation of the curvilinear direct effects. First, the curvilinear relationship
between competition and performance is found to be moderated by competitive action diversity
(β=-1.78, p<.01). This relationship is graphically depicted in Figure 5.7. Likewise, the
curvilinear relationship between cooperation and performance is also found to be moderated by
cooperative diversity (β=1.06, p<.01). This relationship is graphically depicted in Figure 5.8.
Lastly, the relationship between cooperation and firm performance is negative when firm
performance is measured as ROS (linear β=-.21, p<.10; quadratic β=.21, p<.05), whereas in the
overall sample and the medical devices subsample, the results suggest a positive curvilinear
effect. The fit of the direct curvilinear model, however, is only marginally better than the
previous linear model. As such, these effects should be interpreted with caution.
Finally, additional analyses were conducted to examine the balance associated with
competition and cooperation and how this balance influences firm performance. While the
interaction between moderate levels of competition and cooperation was not significant, this
relationship was further explored by creating ordinal values associated with high, medium, and
low levels of competition and cooperation. The sample was split into three levels of competition
and cooperation based on an assessment of the distribution across the sample (Ketchen & Shook,
1996). This categorization of the data generated a 3x3 matrix with observations in each cell
determined by the level of competition and cooperation. Calculating and testing the significance
of differences based on levels of competition and cooperation allows for a more nuanced analysis
of how competition and cooperation integratively influence firm performance.
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Table 5.13: Lagged Competitive and Cooperative Action to Performance (ROA), Oil and Gas Field Services
Model 1 (Controls)
Independent Variables:
Competitive Action
Competitive Action Squared
Cooperative Action
Cooperative Action Squared

Model 2 (Direct Linear
Effects)
.00
.03

Model 3 (Direct Linear
and Curvilinear)
-.05
.11
-.02
.05

Moderators:
Competitive Diversity
Cooperative Diversity

Model 4 (Linear,
Curvilinear,
Moderators)
-.05
.13
.01
.03

-.07
.18
.07
-.23

-.01†
-.02

-.03
.02

Interactions:
Competitive Action x
Competitive Diversity
Competitive Action Squared
x Competitive Diversity
Cooperative Action x
Cooperative Diversity
Cooperative Action Squared
x Cooperative Diversity
Controls:
Size
Slack
Performance Variation
TMT Function
TMT Age
TMT Tenure
TMT Size

Model 5 (Linear
Curvilinear, Moderators,
Interactions)

-.07
.12
.01
.11

-.05*
.02*
.00
.00
.01†
.00
.00

-.05†
.02†
.00
.01
.01*
.00
.00

-.04†
.02
-.01
-.02†
.01*
.00
.01

-.04†
.02
-.01
-.02*
.01*
.00
.00

-.03
.01
-.01
-.02*
.02*
.00
.00

R2
.67**
.68**
.69**
.71**
.73**
F-Test
F=1.27
F=1.75
F=2.85†
F=1.2
Notes: n=141. Reported betas are standardized. ** significance at the .01 level; * significance at the .05 level; † significance at the .10 level. Firm, Year, and
Industry effects are controlled, but not reported due to length.
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Table 5.14: Lagged Competitive and Cooperative Action to Performance (ROS), Oil and Gas Field Services
Model 1 (Controls)
Independent Variables:
Competitive Action
Competitive Action
Squared
Cooperative Action
Cooperative Action
Squared

Model 2 (Direct Linear
Effects)
-.18**

-.01

Model 3 (Direct Linear
and Curvilinear)

Model 4 (Linear,
Curvilinear,
Moderators)

-.34*

-.34*

-.10

.37

.32

-.48

-.21†

-.35*

-.36*

.21*

.28*

-.94

Moderators:
Competitive Diversity
Cooperative Diversity

-.01
.12†

Interactions:
Competitive Action x
Competitive Diversity
Competitive Action
Squared x Competitive
Diversity
Cooperative Action x
Cooperative Diversity
Cooperative Action
Squared x Cooperative
Diversity
Controls:
Size
Slack
Performance Variation
TMT Function
TMT Age
TMT Tenure
TMT Size

Model 5 (Linear
Curvilinear, Moderators,
Interactions)

-.49**
.63**

.13
-1.78**
-.54**
1.06**

-.29*
.01
-.04
-.02
.01
.04
.00

-.23†
.03
-.04
-.02
.01
.03
.00

-.21
.01
-.05
-.04
.01
.04
.01

-.17
.02
-.04
-.04
.02
.03
.01

-.10
.01
-.02
-.03
.03
.01
.00

R2
.76**
.78**
.80**
.80**
.83**
F-Test
F=4.01*
F=2.78†
F=1.82
F=4.83**
Notes: n=135. Reported betas are standardized. ** significance at the .01 level; * significance at the .05 level; † significance at the .10 level. Firm, Year, and
Industry effects are controlled, but not reported due to length.
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To test for significant differences among the groups, a 3x3 ANOVA test was conducted.
The results provided a comparison and statistical test for significant differences in performance
based on the level of both competition and cooperation of a firm. For example, it allows for an
analysis of how an organization with high competition and moderate cooperation relates to an
organization with moderate competition and low cooperation. This analysis was conducted on
both of the original measures of performance in the previous analysis, ROA and ROS. The
results are similar across measures. Interestingly, neither sample has organizations with low
competition and high cooperation. This may be indicative of organizational behavior regarding
how cooperative behaviors are leveraged for competitive actions. In essence, organizations that
are highly engaged in cooperative relationships might use these cooperative engagements to
initiate competitive actions. As such, there are no organizations that are highly cooperative with
low levels of competition. The specific analyses and results are summarized below.

Table 5.15: 3x3 ANOVA Sample, with ROA
Low Coop
Medium Coop
High Coop
Low Comp
Mean=.06, n=49
Mean=-.06, n=9
Medium Comp
Mean=.05, n=82
Mean=.03, n=71
Mean=.09, n=31
High Comp
Mean=.05, n=2
Mean=.06, n=16
Mean=.09, n=37
Reported means are measured as ROA

In the ROA sample, the relationships are largely consistent across groups within the
ANOVA. The means are generally consistent across levels of competition and cooperation;
however, contrary to hypotheses, the middle cell indicating balance of competition and
cooperation has the lowest level of performance. While these relationships show some
differentiation among levels, the only statistically significant group difference is found between
the high competition, medium cooperation group and the medium competition, medium
cooperation group. As shown in the square line in the plot below, the results suggest that
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organizations with high levels of competition and medium cooperation outperform organizations
with medium levels of both competition and cooperation. This relationship may be indicative of
higher performance of organizations that maximize the resources and synergies from cooperative
engagements by simultaneously engaging in higher levels of competition as a result of the value
derived from cooperation. In essence, firms that leverage the cooperative engagements through
competitive actions yield higher levels of performance as a result. Finally, the group of
organizations with high levels of competition and cooperation also have higher levels of
performance; however, the difference between groups is nonsignificant. Below is the interaction
plot that shows the differences of the 3x3 interaction.

Cooperative Action

Competitive Action

Figure 5.9: 3x3 ANOVA of Competition
and Cooperation to ROA

When the data are run with ROS as the measure of performance, the results are similar
with one unique difference. While there was one group with significant differences in the ROA
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analyses, none of the groups are significantly different in the ROS sample; however, the results
are still shown to identify the similarity and differences between the ROS and ROA samples.

Table 5.16: 3x3 ANOVA Sample, with ROS
Low Coop
Low Comp
Mean=.11, n=50
Medium Comp
Mean=.06, n=86
High Comp
Mean=.05, n=2
Reported means are measured as ROS

Medium Coop
Mean=-.02, n=11
Mean=.05, n=68
Mean=-.01, n=17

High Coop
Mean=.09, n=33
Mean=.11, n=37

While the means across the ROA sample were largely similar, there is a broader variation
of means when the firm’s performance is measured with ROS. None of the group differences
were found to be significant, but the plot below shows interesting differences among the groups.
Most distinctly, the highest group mean for performance as found at low levels of competition
and cooperation. This result may be influenced by the high number of organizations with a lack
of substantial cooperative action reported. At medium levels of cooperation, there is a distinctly
higher level of performance when competitive action is also medium within the medium
cooperation groups. While this difference is not statistically significant, it still suggests that the
relationship may be curvilinear in regards to balance leading to optimal levels of performance in
medium cooperation contexts. In general, however, the highest level of performance in this
sample was again found when organizations had higher levels of cooperative activity. Finally,
the performance at moderate levels of competition tends to be more consistent, whereas the
performance of low and high competition groups has a wider spread of means. While none of
the differences were significant, the analysis provides a starting point for further analysis in the
future.
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Cooperative Action

Competitive Action

Figure 5.10: 3x3 ANOVA of
Competition and Cooperation to ROS
Limitations
While this research model provides a unique perspective of integrating micro and macro
factors in the context of competition and cooperation, it is not without its limitations. The first
limitation is the small sample size of the current study. From a pragmatic perspective, the laborintensive nature of developing dictionaries, independently coding and analyzing thousands of
headlines, and developing new measurement tools for competition and cooperation limited the
size and scope of the sample that could be tested in the present study. While a sample size of
300 firm-year observations may be considered small compared to the strategic management
literature at large, it is consistent with the norms and samples of similar research integrating
competition and cooperation and applying a content analysis framework of data collection and
coding(Marcel et al., 2011).
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Second, the dual industry sample may limit the generalizability of the results found in the
present study. The sample was limited to two industries for a variety of reasons. First, to truly
assess the nature of competition and cooperation within industries, the best way of analyzing the
phenomena of interest was to capture data that analyzes and assesses a holistic picture of the
industry. The stratified industry sample contains firms of all sizes within specific competitive
domains. Second, by limiting the sample to two industries, it allowed for controlling broader
macro factors that may influence the nature of competition and cooperation within the industries.
Although firm and year specific events were controlled for independently of industry, the dual
industry sample implicitly controls for other external environmental factors that may confound
the research model.
A third limitation associated with the present study is the nature of the measures and
content analysis, at large. The definition of content analysis, and the methodology itself, is
limited to the extent that content is reported and available to be analyzed (Duriau et al., 2007).
As such, content analysis is limited by the data available in the form of public reports, news
reports, press releases, and other mediums of communication. This research study followed the
existing norms associated with identifying news sources, collecting news reports, and coding the
content of these reports to ensure that the results and inferences made are valid and consistent
with the expectations of rigor in the existing content analysis literature (Neuendorf, 2002).
Beyond the empirical limitations, there are also inherent theoretical and conceptual
limitations associated with the present study. First, the predictive assumptions and relationships
tested are limited to the scope of the theoretical frameworks applied. In other words, the
relationships were defined and limited by the extent to which ABV and the ambidexterity shed
light on the influence of attention on firm actions and the subsequent performance implications
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associated with these actions. While other theories such as signaling theory may lend insight
into how organizations engage in actions to develop a position and identity within an industry
(Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011), the focus of the present study is to understand the
nature and management of attention in relation to firm actions (Ocasio & Joseph, 2005). Further,
signaling theory focuses more on the external motivations for competitive and cooperative action
(Connelly et al., 2010), whereas ABV lends itself to a deeper understanding of the internal
conflict associated with competition and cooperation (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014).
Finally, there are also conceptual or structural limitations associated with the present
study. While the present study operationalizes firm performance based on existing research
practices in both competitive dynamics and the broader strategic management literature, other
research suggests a need for focusing on more direct and related measures rather than using
global measures of firm performance (Ray, Barney, & Muhanna, 2004). The lack of findings in
some of the relationships may be a result of firm performance being too far removed from the
actions of the organization. By assessing performance using returns based metrics which are
inherently internally derived, the model may fail to fully capture the market dynamics that
influence the relationships between market actions and firm performance (Richard et al., 2009).
Considering the multidimensional nature of firm performance (Combs et al., 2005), future
conceptualizations of the relationship between actions and firm performance should leverage
more nuanced and focused measures of firm performance that align with the predictions and
assumptions of existing theory.
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION
Results of a research project in isolation provide little value or contribution to the field of
strategic management without being tied to and integrated with the extant research. The purpose
of this discussion chapter is to identify how the results of the present research project relate to
the theory and findings of related research in strategic management. To recall, the research
questions of this research can be summarized as:
(1) Does the attention-based view of the firm predict competitive and cooperative
actions?
(2) Does the independent level of competition and cooperation influence firm
performance?
(3) Does type of competitive or cooperative action influence the relationship between
competition/cooperation and performance?
(4) Does the integrative balance of competitive and cooperative actions influence a
firm’s performance?
This chapter provides a discussion of my research findings, with a specific focus on
understanding how these results are consistent with and distinct from extant research.
Specifically, the chapter starts with an overview of the theories that are the focus of the research.
I then discuss the findings from the current research project in reference to the theoretical and
conceptual domains. Third, I review the contributions of the research project, along with
opportunities for future research. Fourth, I discuss the managerial implications of the results.
Finally, I conclude with a summary of the results and outcomes associated with the research
study.
Overview
The study draws on theoretical insights from the attention-based view of the firm (ABV)
and from research on organizational ambidexterity. Critical to the understanding of the research
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model, organizational attention is an important, but limited, resource (Simon, 1947). Thus,
organizational action is engaged as members of an organization direct their limited individual
and collective attention (Ocasio, 1997). From the ambidexterity perspective, it is suggested that
organizations must simultaneously engage in sometimes conflicting arenas of action. In the
traditional definition of ambidexterity, this balance is considered in the context of exploration
and exploitation (Gupta et al., 2006; Raisch et al., 2009). I extend this conceptualization of
balance and the ambidexterity logic to how organizations collectively address and manage the
seemingly conflicting demands associated with competition and cooperation.
The phenomena of competition and cooperation also represent research domains with
strong conceptual underpinnings in the competitive dynamics and alliance portfolio research
streams. Competitive dynamics research has shed light on how competitive action influences
firm performance, and has tested a variety of direct and indirect effects to generate a large body
of literature to support the importance of competitive action to firm performance (Chen & Miller,
2012). Similarly, cooperation research has contributed to the strategic management literature by
identifying and analyzing characteristics of cooperation primarily within dyads that contribute to
higher levels of individual and collaborative performance (Das & Teng, 1998). While
competition and cooperation researchers have independently contributed to the strategic
management literature, research integrating these two phenomena simultaneously is still a
relatively nascent stream of inquiry.
Having provided a brief overview of the relevant research streams, the following section
focuses on identifying the similarities and differences between the dissertation and existing
research. Structurally, the sections are discussed based on their theoretical and contextual
domain—ABV and ambidexterity are discussed as the theoretical foundations, and competitive
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dynamics and cooperation research are discussed in reference to their contextual foundations.
The results of the hypothesis testing and post hoc analyses are discussed in reference to the direct
and indirect effects hypothesized in the model, as well a discussion of how the control
relationships compare and contrast with the existing literature.
Attention Based View of the Firm
At the core of ABV are three concepts: (1) the focus of attention within organizations,
(2) the situated nature of attention, and (3) the structural distribution of attention (Ocasio, 1997).
The directed nature of attention implies that actions will likely be engaged where an individual
or organization devotes attention (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009). The situated nature of attention
implies that attention is relative (Dutton, Ashford, O'Neill, & Lawrence, 2001). Bounded
rationality suggests that attention is a finite resource, and as such, limits and determines how
attention is directed and applied to multiple stimuli (Simon, 1947). The structural distribution of
attention addresses the structural attributes of attention. Managers within the firm develop and
structure organizations based on the existing strategies and objectives of the organization, and
provide insight into the structural distribution of organizational attention (Kabanoff & Brown,
2008). While most research has focused on individual pillars of ABV independently of one
another, this research addresses two of the pillars simultaneously (Ocasio & Joseph, 2008).
Organizational attention, or the aggregation and application of attention of organizational
members, has yet to be fully conceptualized or empirically explored in the existing ABV
literature (Ocasio, 2011). This research focuses on understanding how an organization positions
and self-identifies phenomena and issues that are important for the organization to address at the
organization level. By linking the firm-reported attention to competition and cooperation at the
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organizational level in annual reports to the enactment of competitive and cooperative action,
this research takes a step toward extending ABV to a new level of analysis.
The findings of the attention-based relationships in the research model align well with the
existing research while also adding to the field with new constructs and measures. Prior research
has analyzed the effects of executive attention on the enactment of specific actions of the
organization (Kaplan, 2008; Marcel et al., 2011); however, the present model assesses the
relationships between attention to competition and cooperation and subsequent competitive and
cooperative action at the firm level. Testing the direct relationships between competitive and
cooperative actions provides an empirical analysis of the focus of attention and also the situated
nature of attention proposed by ABV.
First, ABV was leveraged to theorize that competitive actions are positively influenced
by competitive attention (H1a), and negatively influenced by cooperative attention (H2b). While
these results were not found to be significant, the relationships were both in the direction
suggested by the theory and the hypotheses. These results may have been found for a few
reasons. First, competitive actions are not likely to be explicated ex ante due to the nature of the
information being shared. Organizations may not choose to willingly identify and disclose the
competitive factors deemed most important to the organization for fear of giving away valuable
information that can be readily accessed by competitors in publicly available documents
(Midgley, Marks, & Cooper, 1997). In other words, organizations may not address competitive
factors in annual reports to avoid the potential dangers associated with “showing their next
move” to competitors (Chen, 1996). Second, competitive actions are not all equal in magnitude.
An organization’s decision to invest heavily in research in development and an organization’s
small donation to a non-profit are weighted equally in the present study. This measurement of

104

competitive action is consistent with the extant competitive dynamics research, and suggests a
need for a deeper analysis in regards to competitive action weighting (Chen & Miller, 2012).
Annual reports are likely to predict the larger types of competitive actions due to their scope, but
some of the smaller competitive actions may not be referenced or addressed in the organization’s
report.
In the control relationships, slack was found to be strongly and significantly related to the
enactment of competitive activity (β=15.6, p<.01). This is consistent with the research that
suggests liquid assets offer organizations opportunities to leverage these resources with relatively
short lead times for competitive actions (George, 2005). In other words, organizations with
available liquid assets are more readily able to leverage these resources to enact competitive
actions. A second significant finding in the controls relationships is the negative effect of TMT
functional diversity and the enactment of competitive actions (β=-5.60, p<.01). This negative
relationships suggests that organizations with more diverse top management teams enact fewer
competitive actions. This finding supports the notion that too much diversity on a top
management team may lead to organizational rigidity and an inability to develop consensus and
enact competitive actions in the market (Smith et al., 1994).
Second, the relationships were tested in relation to the enactment of cooperative actions.
The positive relationship between cooperative attention and cooperative action (H1b) was found
to be significant (β=.63, p<.01); however, the negative relationship between competitive
attention and cooperative action was not found to be significant (H2a). The nonfindings for the
negative relationship may again be attributed to the nature of competitive attention.
Organizations may choose to speak vaguely in terms of competitive attention in order to avoid
showing competitors their future actions and strategies. As such, a strong direct correlation may
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not be found due to the broad scope of the annual report (Huselid, 1995). The positive
relationship partially supports the ABV notion of focused attention, in that organizational
attention as measured by annual reports is positively associated with the subsequent enactment of
cooperative activity. This finding extends the existing research leveraging letters to shareholders
by testing this relationship at the organizational level (Marcel et al., 2011).
Size was also found to be negatively and significantly related to the enactment of
cooperative actions (β=-2.24, p<.01). This negative relationship suggests that larger firms have
fewer cooperative engagements relative to their smaller counterparts. This finding suggests that
larger organizations are not as dependent on other organizations, and as such require fewer
relationships to be competitive (Gomes-Casseres, 1997). This supports recent research
suggesting that smaller, more entrepreneurial firms are more reliant on cooperative relationships
(Kellermanns, Walter, Crook, Kemmerer, & Narayanan, 2014).
TMT characteristics were also found to be significant in relation to competitive and
cooperative action, and these results largely support the extant research on upper echelons
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984). First, TMT functional diversity is found to be positively related to
cooperative action (β=.57, p<.01). This finding suggests that more diverse top management
teams identify cooperative engagements as a unique way to integrate knowledge and other
resources into the organization through cooperative engagements. The findings in regards to size
and TMT functional diversity aligns well with research examining the relationship between TMT
characteristics, the interdependence of organizations, and the performance implications of
functional diversity within firms. with varying degrees of interdependence with other
organizations (Michel & Hambrick, 1992). While existing research has addressed TMT
characteristics as an indirect determinant of competitive actions (Ferrier & Lyon, 2004; Miller &
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Chen, 1996), the present findings suggest further exploration of attention as a direct effect may
provide valuable insights into the antecedents of competitive and cooperative actions. Finally,
TMT size was negatively related to cooperative engagements (β=-.41, p<.05). This finding may
be indicative of smaller top management teams reaching consensus about cooperative activities
than larger top management teams, possibly as a result of lower conflict within the TMT
(Amason & Sapienza, 1997).
The relationships tested in the attention side of the model provide an intriguing starting
point for future research leveraging ABV. While only one of the hypothesis was statistically
significant (H1b), the relationships in the model suggest a need for further exploration into the
situated nature of attention in regards to potentially conflicting phenomena within the
organizational context. Competitive attention may require a deeper analysis leveraging
qualitative methodology to further explore if and how organizations address competitive factors
at the organizational level. This type of analysis would align well with existing studies assessing
attention (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Marcel et al., 2011), but would also extend this research by
analyzing attention as an organizational phenomenon. Considering these intriguing findings,
future research addressing organizational level manifestations of attention are likely to contribute
and extend both the ABV literature and the strategic management literature.
The implied paradox associated with the attention to competition and cooperation as a
result of bounded rationality and the finite nature of attention within the organization was not
supported by the findings. While only one of the four hypotheses is supported in the analysis,
the directionality of the results generally support the implicit paradox of competition and
cooperation within the firm. This interdependence of attention to competition and cooperation
suggests further exploration into how organizations and top management teams enact optimal
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levels of competitive and cooperative activity. Considering the finite nature of attention within
the firm and the implicit paradox associated with competition and cooperation, I also hope to
contribute to the domain of ambidexterity.
Ambidexterity
The second theoretical framework for the research is found in the conceptual foundations
in the ambidexterity literature. At the core of ambidexterity is the concept of paradox and the
necessary balance and potential complementarity associated with paradoxical actions (March,
1991; Raisch et al., 2009). While this framework has largely been limited to the discussion of
exploration and exploitation (He & Wong, 2004), the logical tenets are not conceptualized such
that they are contextually bounded. As such, this research takes an early step towards leveraging
the ambidexterity logic in a paradoxical context outside of the exploration and exploitation
domain.
The conflicting interests between competition and cooperation are largely implicit, and
the true nature of these two behaviors has yet to be fully explored at the organization level.
Research integrating these two paradoxical behaviors has largely been assessed at the dyad level,
specifically assessing the pure coopetition between two organizations (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014;
Park et al., 2013). While this perspective provides unique insight into the relationship between
competition and cooperation within a dyadic relationship, it ignores an organization’s overall
competitive and cooperative orientation. The present research suggests that competition and
cooperation do not occur in a vacuum, and the actions associated with competition and
cooperation attention have interdependent characteristics that must be managed appropriately at
the organizational level.
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Integrating ideas from ambidexterity research with the concept of bounded rationality, a
better understanding of the finite nature of attention emerges. In particular, the need for
simultaneous attention toward both competitive and cooperative actions becomes clearer. As
discussed above, only a few of these relationships were identified as significant. However, the
inherent conflict between the competitive and cooperative attention can be seen in the positive
effects from attention to competition and cooperation to their respective actions (H1a and H1b),
and the negative crossover effect of cooperative attention on competitive action (H2b). While
the relationships were not found to be significant, the direction of the relationships suggest that
attention to one action is inherently relative to the attention devoted to another action. More
broadly, this suggests an inherent conflict that warrants further empirical exploration.
While ambidexterity research provides conceptual implications for the balance of
competitive and cooperative attention, it also applies to identifying optimal levels of competitive
and cooperative actions (Park et al., 2013). The preliminary findings from the post hoc analyses
suggest that higher levels of both competition and cooperation yield higher levels of firm
performance. The initial operationalization of balance by generating an industry adjusted level
of competition and cooperation yielded nonsignificant findings (H5). However, when taking a
more granular look using the 3x3 ANOVA analysis of the multiple groups at low, medium, and
high levels of competition and cooperation, it suggests that the highest performing firms, when
assessed in relation to both competition and cooperation, were the firms with high levels of
cooperation and high levels of competition. These results are consistent with the results found in
the independent competition and cooperation literature (Das & Teng, 1998; Ferrier et al., 1999);
however, by assessing these relationships simultaneously, it suggests that competition and
cooperation integratively yield higher levels of firm performance. Considering the highest
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performance was generally found at high levels of competition and cooperation, the findings
suggest a synergistic relationship between two paradoxical actions as conceptualized in the
ambidexterity research.
A key implication and contribution of the study is that balance is not necessarily defined
as 50/50. In other words, balance is not assessed based on a 1:1 relationship of competitive and
cooperative actions. It is balance relative to the peers within the industry. Balance is found to be
positively related to firm performance at high levels of both competition and cooperation,
partially supported at moderate levels of competition and cooperation, and unassessed at low
levels of competition and cooperation as a result of a lack of firms with low levels of both
competition and cooperation. Again, the strong performance of organizations with high levels of
competition and cooperation suggest the balance of these actions yields better performance (Park
et al., 2013). These preliminary findings suggest a need for further exploration into the
potentially synergistic relationship between the implicitly interdependent actions of competition
and cooperation.
Competitive Dynamics
Competitive dynamics research has focused on identifying antecedents and outcomes
associated with the enactment of competitive actions of organizations (Ketchen et al., 2004). To
date, researchers have been able to identify organizational actions that contribute to competitive
advantages and higher firm performance (Smith et al., 2001), direct and indirect effects of
competitive activity, types of competitive activity, and firm characteristics to further extend the
domain of competitive dynamics (Chen & Miller, 2012). The results from the present study
align well with this focus on dynamic actions of organizations (Rindova & Kotha, 2001), and
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extend the empirical frontiers of competitive dynamics by conceptualizing and testing curvilinear
and indirect effects of competition antecedents and outcomes at the organization level.
Often lacking in competitive dynamics research is the simultaneous assessment of
antecedents and outcomes associated with competitive activity in an integrative model (Smith et
al., 2001). Research often examines antecedents of competitive actions and outcomes of
competitive actions as largely independent of one another (Chen & Miller, 2012). This research
focuses on understanding how attention shapes competitive actions, and the subsequent
performance implications of these actions in an integrative model. While attention is not found
to be significantly related to competitive action in the original model, the post hoc analysis of a
non-lagged relationship suggest marginal support that competitive attention (as shown within the
annual report) is positively related to the enactment of competitive actions (H1a). This may
suggest that the decision making processes associated with competition are more immediate than
the decision making processes associated with cooperative actions (Georgiou, Becchio, Glover,
& Castiello, 2007). Further research exploring an integrative assessment of organizational level
attention in relation to competitive activity may yield intriguing results regarding how and when
organizations engage in competitive action. A potentially important implication is that a closer
examination of the temporal effects of attention on actions appears needed.
In strategic management and competitive dynamics research, the vast majority of the
studies assume and analyze linear relationships (Chen & Miller, 2012). This research posits that
the linear assumptions and predictions are not necessarily always the case. The relationships in
the research model proposed a curvilinear effect of competitive action on firm performance, such
that competitive actions yield diminishing returns at higher levels of activity (H3b). When
performance is measured as ROS the results actually suggest a negative relationship with a
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positive curvilinear effect, resulting in a U-shaped relationship between competitive actions and
firm performance. In other words, as organizations increase competitive activity, the returns
become increasingly larger.
This finding may suggest that organizations improve in their ability to capitalize on
competitive actions as they engage in more competitive activity overall (Ingram & Baum, 1997).
These learning effects might translate into higher levels of performance for the organization
(Garvin, 2000). Although this finding does not align with the existing competitive dynamics
research that suggests a positive linear effect of competitive activity on firm performance, the
models are analyzed in the presence of cooperative actions. Previous research that treated and
analyzed competitive and cooperative actions as independent only provides a partial
representation of how these actions influence firm performance. When competitive and
cooperative action are analyzed simultaneously, the effects associated with competition and
cooperation become more evident. These results from the integrative models warrant further
exploration.
Third, in the post hoc analysis of the oil and gas field services industry, although the main
effects of the curvilinear and linear relationships of competitive actions and performance are not
significant, the significant moderation of these relationships—or the difference between the
slopes—at low and high levels of diversity of competitive actions suggests interesting results
(H4b). When competitive diversity is low, the relationship is convex (U-shape); however, at
high competitive action diversity the relationship is concave (inverted U-shape). This
moderation suggests that when actions are largely similar, organizations are able to increase
performance through repetition of these behaviors. This is consistent with the development and
application of heuristics (Bingham et al., 2007). On one hand, low levels of diversity allow for
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organizational learning to be applied to improve firm performance (Miller, 1993a). On the other
hand, the results are also consistent with research on misappropriation of heuristics when
competitive diversity is high. The results suggest that at high levels of competitive diversity,
organizations may be overlooking discrepancies between actions and fail to apply the necessary
due diligence to ensure the competitive actions are appropriate (Miller & Chen, 1996). These
intriguing results in the subsample warrant further exploration of the moderating effects of
diversity of competitive activity on the relationship between competitive actions and firm
performance.
Cooperation
Traditionally, cooperation research has leveraged a structural or relational perspective to
understanding the challenges and benefits of cooperation. On one hand, network theory has been
applied to understand how a firm’s relative position within a structural network of peers can lead
to competitive advantages (Provan et al., 2007). On the other hand, research on dyadic
relationships has provided rich insight into the nature of cooperation within specific cooperative
engagements (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Research on cooperation at the organization level has been
limited, although research addressing alliance portfolios has provided an initial conceptualization
of how organizations manage cooperative engagements holistically (Wassmer, 2010). The
research presented here extends the alliance portfolio literature by simultaneously assessing the
organization level cooperation and competition in the same research model.
Alliance portfolio research has largely focused on performance implications of different
cooperative actions (Jiang et al., 2010; Lavie, 2007). This research is consistent with the existing
research by examining outcomes of cooperative action, but it simultaneously analyzes the
antecedents of cooperative action, as well. The results suggest that the attention devoted to
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cooperation at the firm level is associated with of the enactment of subsequent cooperative
activity (H1b). This extends the existing literature by examining the presence and effect of a
theoretically grounded measure of attention as an antecedent of cooperative action of the firm.
In terms of outcomes associated with cooperative action, the results provide interesting
contributions to the literature—namely the significance of the curvilinear relationship between
cooperation and firm performance (H3a). As hypothesized, the results support the notion of
diminishing returns as cooperative actions increase. Challenging the existing linear analyses
present in extant research, this research suggests that cooperation is beneficial to the
organization, to a point. The curvilinear findings are consistent with the misappropriation of
heuristics, while also supporting the notion of organizational learning at low to moderate levels
of cooperative action (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Rothaermel, 2001).
Also of interest to cooperation research are the moderation effects of cooperative action
diversity in the proposed model and the post hoc robustness tests. Supporting the hypothesized
moderating effects, organizations with higher levels of diversity in cooperative engagements
have lower levels of performance when overall cooperative action is high (H4a). However,
higher levels of cooperative diversity are beneficial at low levels of cooperative actions. This
may support the notion that organizations seek out and contract companies with unrelated
expertise to increase firm performance rather than incur the costs associated with conducting
these unrelated actions within the organization (Jones & Hill, 1988; Williamson, 1981).
Also, the interaction of volume and diversity of cooperative actions further supports the
misappropriation of heuristics outlined above. In other words, the increase in number and type
of cooperative actions provides more opportunities for managers to not only engage in too many
cooperative actions but also engaging in the wrong types of cooperative engagements (Gulati et
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al., 2012). While these relationships are beneficial at low levels of overall cooperation, the
danger of misappropriated heuristics appears to become even greater when the cooperative
actions are highly diverse and unrelated (Jiang et al., 2010). Considering the presence of the
moderating effect in the full model and several robustness tests, further research integrating both
quantity and diversity of cooperative actions is likely to provide valuable contributions to the
cooperation literature. In particular, there is still a need to further explore the effects of
cooperative actions in the presence of competition to fully understand how organizations
leverage cooperative engagements through competitive actions.
Summary of Contributions
By developing and testing a theoretically grounded research model that addresses both
antecedents and outcomes of competitive and cooperative actions of organizations, this research
makes the following contributions. First, this research represents some of the earliest
operationalization and empirical analysis of attention at the organizational level. The assessment
of attention, action, and performance at the organizational level extends the existing ABV
literature by developing and applying a dictionary and framework of analysis that can be applied
in future research. By developing and validating this dictionary, it offers future researchers the
opportunity to analyze an organization’s holistic application of attention and how this direction
of attention is manifested in actions. In terms of results of the present study, I found significant
positive effects of attention to cooperation to cooperative actions. I also found significance in
non-lagged models of attention to competition in relation to competitive actions. These results
suggest the presence of organizational attention and the direct effects of this attention on the
enactment of competitive and cooperative actions.
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Second, the model proposed and tested curvilinear relationships to challenge the existing
linear assumptions in both competition and cooperation literatures. The curvilinear effects of
cooperation on firm performance were largely supported (H3a), however the curvilinear
relationship between competition and firm performance was found to be nonsignificant (H3b).
These direct effects suggest that the theories applied and analyses conducted should consider the
diminishing returns associated with organizations’ actions. Rather than assuming and analyzing
relationships as purely linear in nature, future theory development should consider the potentially
curvilinear effects associated with organizational actions.
Third, the model moved beyond studying merely quantity of organizational actions and
simultaneous assessed the nature of actions, as well. Rather than simply assessing relationships
based solely on volume of competitive or cooperative activity, this research tests the moderating
effects of type or diversity of competitive and cooperative actions on the existing curvilinear
relationships. These moderating effects were found to be significant in the cooperative action
relationships (H4a), and also in some of the post hoc analyses on the competition to performance
relationship (H4b). This research is an early attempt to test and find significant moderating
effects of action diversity on the curvilinear relationships between competitive and cooperative
actions and subsequent firm performance.
Fourth, the timing of performance outcomes represents an interesting opportunity for
future research. The results suggest differential effects on firm performance depending on how
and when performance is assessed. For example, cooperative actions’ influence on firm
performance is largely realized when measured as ROA—suggesting a longer term commitment
of resources for a more holistic and long term positive effect on firm performance. When
measured as ROS, however, the relationship between competition and performance is significant.
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The window of opportunity, and the time needed to effectively develop competitive and
cooperative actions, may be different based on the type of action being performed by the
organization. Further research exploring the timing and even sequencing of competitive and
cooperative actions would provide deeper insights into the dynamic nature of competitive and
cooperative actions.
Fifth, this research describes and tests the importance of balanced competition and
cooperation. Leveraging conceptual tenets from the ambidexterity logic (March, 1991), the
model assesses the interdependent relationship between competition and cooperation in both the
attention and action contexts. From the attention perspective, the relationship between attention
to competition and cooperation is implied to be a zero sum relationship such that attention to one
is at the expense of another. This is seen in the significant positive linear effects, and implied by
the negative, though nonsignificant, effects of attention to cooperation on competitive actions
(H1 and H2).
In terms of balance of actions, a firm’s ability to effectively leverage competitive and
cooperative actions are likely limited by the extent to which organizational members are able to
devote the necessary time and effort to these actions. While firms can engage in high levels of
competition or cooperation, ambidexterity posits that an inherent balance of potentially
synergistic actions like competition and cooperation is necessary (Park et al., 2013). While I
hypothesized balance based on moderate levels of both competition and cooperation (H5), the
results generally support the positive effects of high levels of competition and cooperation rather
than moderate levels of both. This does not rule out the synergistic effects, but rather suggests a
potentially stronger synergistic effect than previously assumed. This analysis of balance and
interdependence of competition and cooperation provides a starting point for futures research
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simultaneously assessing the effects of competition and cooperation on firm performance at the
organization level.
In terms of theoretical contribution, this research further explores the boundary
conditions associated with ABV. In the extant research, attention is measured solely at the
individual level (Kaplan, 2008; Marcel et al., 2011). This research posits that an organization’s
attention is a product of the managers’ and members’ attention within the organization and
examines how this composite attention influences an organization’s actions. By extending ABV
to another level, developing and testing a new measure of attention, and assessing the focused
and situated tenets of attention in congruence with ambidexterity, this research extends ABV
theory while also providing measurement tools for future research in this domain.
While this research does not fit the pure definition of coopetition as indicated by
simultaneous competition and cooperation within a dyad (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014), it does
provide results that explore the interdependence of these two actions at the firm level. Rather
than focusing on the relationship level of analysis, this research takes an organizational approach
to understand how firms leverage competitive and cooperative actions simultaneously. While
coopetition is defined by the dyad, the present study approaches the integration of competition
and cooperation as a firm level phenomenon. In other words, this study suggests that a firm’s
coopetitive orientation provides an assessment of how firms simultaneous manage and leverage
the potential synergies associated with competition and cooperation. By taking an early step
towards assessing firm level competition and cooperation integratively, this research extends
coopetition beyond the limited scope of individual relationships and offers a firm level
operationalization of coopetition. This approach of assessing firm level actions may yield a
strong connection and contribution to the broader strategic management literature.
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Managerial Implications
For results to be translated and applied to real world contexts, it is important to identify
the tangible outcomes associated with a given research project. At the core of the present
research is the inherent paradox associated with the ever present actions of competition and
cooperation. All organizations engage in competitive and cooperative action, and how
organizations and individuals manage these seemingly contradictory actions have performance
implications. The results of the present study can be broken down based on the relationships
being tested: (1) the relationships between competitive and cooperative attention to actions and
(2) the relationships between competitive and cooperative actions and firm performance.
In terms of attention leading to action, the results provide evidence that attention of
individuals and organizations is limited. The results and relationships suggest that where an
organization directs the attention of its members is likely to be related to subsequent actions by
the organization. Specifically, the results suggest that attention to cooperation is positively
related to cooperative action. The results also suggest partial support for attention to competitive
factors leading to the enactment of competitive actions. While nonsignificant, the results also
suggest a relative nature of attention. In other words, the direction of attention to one factor may
be at the expense of directing that attention to another. From a managerial perspective, these
results suggest a need for direction and management of organizational members’ attention on the
types of actions an organization hopes to enact. By explicitly addressing, directing, and
managing attention within the organization, managers will likely be able to more effectively
address the important and relevant factors the organization faces.
Second, the results provide interesting implications for the relationship between firm
actions and firm performance. As a result of the analysis of high, medium, and low levels of
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competition and cooperation, these results suggest an obvious need for both competitive and
cooperative actions for higher levels of firm performance. Considering the strong levels of
performance when competitive and cooperative action are high, the results suggest that these two
actions are potentially interdependent and provide synergistic performance implications for a
firm. While the results suggest a need for both competitive and cooperative actions, these
actions must be carefully managed and applied. When the results are analyzed based on volume
and type of actions, the implications suggest caution regarding engaging in too many or too
diverse competitive or cooperative actions. For instance cooperative actions have diminishing
returns at high levels, and further these diminishing returns are magnified when the cooperative
actions are highly diverse.
In regards to competitive actions, the results suggest that the highest performance occurs
at low and high levels of competitive activity. In terms of volume of actions, moderate
competitive action is found to have the lowest level of performance. On one hand, low levels of
competitive activity may indicate a focus on a small but effective repertoire of competitive
actions. On the other hand, it might suggest that organizations that engage in higher levels of
competitive actions become more effective at leveraging these actions due to learning effects and
repetition. Considering these findings, organizational managers need to focus on competitive
actions that the firm leverages effectively and identify opportunities to apply these actions when
and where appropriate.
Conclusion
The focus of my dissertation is to extend the strategic management literature by
examining the nature of relationships among competition and cooperation, and how these
relationships influence firm performance. By integrating the conceptual implications of the
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attention based view of the firm with ambidexterity in the context of competitive and cooperative
actions of organizations, this dissertation provides conceptual and empirical contributions to the
strategic management literature. It conceptually defines and empirically tests a sequential model
that links internal factors of the organization with the subsequent actions of the organizations. It
also analyzes how these actions influence subsequent firm performance. The present research
suggests that, while existing research largely treats competition and cooperation independently of
one another, an interdependent conceptualization of these two phenomena may be more
appropriate. From an attention perspective, cooperative attention was found to be significantly
related to the enactment of cooperative action. Second, the relationship between cooperative
action and firm performance was found to be significant and with the hypothesized diminishing
returns. Finally, the moderating effect of cooperative diversity on the existing curvilinear
relationship between cooperative action and performance was found to be significant, such that
higher diversity increased the diminishing returns at lower levels of cooperative activity.
Broadly speaking, this research will hopefully stimulate and encourage future research to address
the unique relationships among competition and cooperation, and to further explore how these
relationships influence organizational performance.
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